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

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REPORT

ON

THE DIPLOMATIC ARCHIVES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 1789-1840

PAPERS OF BUREAU OF HISTORICAL RESEARCH, CARNEGIE INSTITUTION OF WASHINGTON,

ANDREW C. MCLAUGHLIN, DIRECTOR

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

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THE DIPLOMATIC ARCHIVES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 1789-1840.

BY ANDREW C. MCLAUGHLIN.

In 1831 Congress authorized the publication of "Congressional Documents" for the first thirteen Congresses, a work proposed by the printers Gales and Seaton. The materials were to be selected under the direction of the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives. At a later session, March 2, 1833, Congress authorized the publication of documents down to the end of the Twenty-second Congress. The result of these resolutions was the printing of the series of folio volumes commonly called *American State Papers*, and more fully entitled *Documents, Legislative and Executive, of the Congress of the United States, from the First Session of the First Congress to the Second Session of the Twenty-second Congress*, a series of great value, which has been of incalculable service to all American historians and to all persons interested in the history of the United States. Only a limited edition was printed, and the set is now not easily obtained. The full set consists of thirty-eight volumes, covering ten different classes of subjects, but we are interested here chiefly in the series of six volumes on Foreign Relations. These contain the important messages of the Presidents from 1789 to 1828, some reports of committees, and like material, but chiefly diplomatic correspondence; they were made up largely from the documents sent to the Senate, from which the Senate had removed the injunction of secrecy, amplified somewhat, though apparently very little, by documents in the files of the Department of State which had not been before the Senate. One of the purposes of the study on which I have based this paper was to discover to what extent the diplomatic correspondence was printed in this series of Foreign Relations, and the extent, character, and value of the unprinted material. It will be remembered that from 1828 to 1860 such diplomatic correspondence as is printed is to be found in the ordinary series of Congressional documents, generally in the Executive docu-

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ments of the respective Congresses, but not infrequently in other places. Any one who has sought information of this character in the Congressional series from 1828 to 1860 knows how puzzling the task is, and especially that, except in a few favored localities, the sets of volumes are not sufficiently complete for a thorough and satisfactory examination. Most of us have probably had the pleasure of finding that the particular volume we desired to use was, by the irony of fate, missing from the set to which we had access.

An examination of the archives of the State Department seems to show conclusively (1) the need of printing *in extenso* the diplomatic correspondence for the period covered by the *State Papers, Foreign Relations* (1789-1828), because of the incompleteness of these volumes, as will be particularly illustrated in the following pages of this report; (2) the need of printing the materials from 1828 to 1860 as fully as the policy and desire of the State Department permit, because of the abundance of interesting material hitherto entirely unprinted and because the documents at one time printed in the Congressional series are now largely inaccessible for the average reader, student, or scholar, and of course altogether out of print.

An examination of the extent of the material in the Bureau of Indexes and Archives has been made, and this not by looking at the outside of the bound volumes, but by turning over the letters page by page. Any one who has tried the task of estimating the length of a manuscript knows how difficult it is to be exact, but in this case it is fair to say, as a result of the examination and of checking over the materials in certain periods, that not more than one-fourth of the material has been printed in the *State Papers.* The despatches and instructions omitted are often of extreme interest. In preparing the following pages, I have not, as a rule, tried to determine whether certain manuscript papers are printed in the writings of distinguished statesmen. Some of these papers are found in such volumes as the *Writings of Jefferson,* and those of Jay, Madison, and Monroe; but the number printed is, comparatively, very small, and they appear generally in limited and expensive editions, which find no place on the shelves of the great mass of students and readers of American history.

The materials printed in the *State Papers* very often appear only in extract. It is unnecessary to say that, so far as their importance for diplomatic history is concerned, the omitted portions are often not the least interesting. Take, for example, a list of papers communicated to the House of Representatives February 5, 1824 (*American State Papers,* Vol. V, [illegible] I take this example quite at random and have not

searched for the most striking. Fifty papers in all were thus communicated. Of these, twenty-two are but extracts of the full despatches or instructions.

The diplomatic archives of the State Department are now contained in two bureaus, the Bureau of Rolls and Library and the Bureau of Indexes and Archives. In the former were contained until recently the papers of the Continental Congress; these papers were, by a recent executive order, transferred to the Library of Congress, but the order expressly authorized the bureau to retain such papers "as in the discretion of the Secretary of State may be required for the continuity and completeness of the records and archives of the Department of State." There are still, therefore, in the Bureau of Rolls and Library the despatches, instructions, and other diplomatic papers that were originally part of the so-called papers of the Continental Congress, and they cover the years from the outbreak of the Revolution to the organization of the government.

It is not my intention in this paper to consider the correspondence before 1789. It is well known that Wharton, in the *Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution,* printed a very satisfactory edition of the papers as far down as November, 1784. The set of *Diplomatic Correspondence, 1783-1789,* in seven volumes, covers the period indicated by the title, and, though one may hazard the guess that the correspondence of that time is not fully printed, it is not necessary to consider that material here. Nothing of importance need be said about the archives in the Bureau of Rolls and Library that belong to the period after the establishment of the government under the Constitution. It is sufficient to say that there is in that bureau one volume of fair copies of notes from the Department and instructions from October, 1788, to December, 1792. This includes the later correspondence of Jay, who did not immediately drop the duties of the office of foreign affairs on the establishment of the new government, and also some of Jefferson's correspondence. Attention might also be called to material that is not strictly classed as diplomatic; for example, the correspondence of Governor Claiborne, who was sent in 1803 to take possession of New Orleans after the cession of Louisiana. This material is full of interesting information concerning the southern frontier and the relations with the Spaniards. But this Claiborne material is not strictly within the purview of this report.

Our concern in this paper is chiefly with the strictly diplomatic correspondence to be found on file in the Bureau of Indexes and Archives, under the charge of Mr. Pendleton King, the chief of the

bureau, to whose kindness and courtesy and permission to examine the manuscripts in his charge the thanks of the compiler of this pamphlet are due. The diplomatic correspondence of the State Department naturally falls into four divisions: (1) Despatches, which include all letters to the Department from our representatives to foreign countries, with which may be classed all inclosures, such as notes sent by ministers of foreign states to our representatives in those states, and other material bearing on foreign conditions; (2) Notes to the Department from foreign legations in this country; (3) Instructions, which include all letters from the Department to our representatives abroad; and (4) Notes from the Department to foreign legations in this country, the word "notes" being used to include all communications. For the purposes of a complete analysis one might naturally include the Consular Despatches and Consular Instructions, and the "Domestic Letters," but none of these sets contains much diplomatic material. Some of the Domestic Letters, which are the correspondence on all sorts of subjects with individuals holding no diplomatic position, are doubtless of diplomatic concern, and moreover it should be especially noted that some of the earlier correspondence of the government which would now be classified otherwise is filed and labeled as "Domestic Letters;" all the notes from the Department, down to 1804, appear in fair copies in the series of volumes entitled "Domestic Letters." With the exception of these notes, the papers discussed in the following pages are included in the four subdivisions given above.

The volumes of diplomatic papers in the Bureau of Indexes and Archives are listed in an inventory-book, in which new volumes are entered when bound. This inventory gives the numbers on the manuscript volumes, showing which volumes are duplicates of others; it also gives the dates of beginning and ending of the volumes, but in many cases, especially in despatches, these dates are not early enough or late enough, as the case may be. The reason for this discrepancy in dates is usually the fact that the letters written before the minister or agent reached his post, and those written after leaving it, are not included in the dates given. In some cases at the end of a volume are found letters written by a former diplomatic officer many years after the termination of his mission. Besides the list of volumes of Despatches, Notes to the Department, Instructions, and Notes from the Department, this inventory contains lists of volumes of Circulars, of Consular Instructions and Consular Despatches, and of volumes pertaining to Consular Clerks, Foreign Consuls in the United States, and Special Agents.

By the help of this inventory, volumes can usually be located readily. The system of arrangement of books is comparatively simple, and in almost all the books the manuscripts are bound in chronological order, the most noteworthy exception being that inclosures are bound after the letter in which they were inclosed, though naturally preceding it in date. The records are, on the whole, in excellent condition, though some of the older papers are considerably discolored, or are brittle and breaking at the edges, thus making the reading of them difficult for the investigator. The handwriting of many of the earlier papers is hard to decipher, even when the ink has not faded. Some of the press copies are at present almost illegible.

The arrangement in earlier years is in some ways perplexing, and sometimes important documents are not to be found. It is no unusual thing to find that despatches of certain numbers are not in the archives, and this in spite of the fact that sometimes as high as five copies of one paper were sent by as many different ships. It is interesting to note how many copies of the original number were received and to compare the dates of sending and of receipt. About 1831 a definite system was adopted. The records since that time are well arranged, and the system is easily understood; the records since 1831 are also more nearly complete, due to a great extent to improvements in navigation, but due also to careful supervision. Duplicates no longer appear, and on the other hand there are no despatches missing, as is the case in the earlier volumes. Evidently about that time our ministers ceased to send duplicate and triplicate despatches, while the Department made arrangements to get copies of documents that for any reason went astray.

The earlier documents are at times somewhat hard to use, the requirement of uniform size in paper being a later development. Besides the manuscripts, one occasionally finds in these volumes printed material, such as pamphlets, invitations, instructions for court dress at times of mourning, and copies of papers or broadsides of the time. Practically all of these are without mention in the *State Papers,* but are interesting to the historian and often almost impossible to obtain elsewhere in this country.

The following description and analysis of the various series may be of service:

(1) From the beginning of the government (1789), despatches from United States ministers abroad have been classified in separate series for the different countries, but occasionally the despatches of a minister who went to two countries are found in one volume, which thus really belongs in two series. This fact is often a source of per-

plexity to the investigator. An understanding of this method of binding will often explain the apparent absence of material in some series.

(2) Notes to the Department from foreign legations in the United States have from the first been bound in separate volumes for different countries. There is one volume of Notes to the Department which contains miscellaneous letters, such as those from special missions to the United States.

(3) The first thirteen volumes of Instructions, covering from January 23, 1791, to March 8, 1833, contain instructions to ministers everywhere. Volumes 14, 15, and 16 (April 2, 1829, to January 14, 1865), are classed as American States. Since January 14, 1865, all instructions have been copied in separate series for each country. The list of dates for the beginning of separate series for each country shows, as I have already said, that each was given a separate series of instructions according to the importance of its diplomatic relations with us.

(4) Notes from the Department to foreign legations in the United States, as I have already said, were at first bound with Domestic Letters, which at that time included all letters to persons not in government employ. Beginning January 19, 1804, a separate series of Notes to the Department was begun. Of this series the first volume, dating from January 19, 1804, to January 25, 1810, and containing 301 separate letters, has long been missing, and only an index to it remains to show its contents. It may not be impossible by one method or another to restore large portions of this lost volume.

Up to 1840 the papers are contained in 366 volumes, not including duplicate volumes. Until that time only 25 countries have separate series. Many of the duplicate papers are bound in separate volumes; in other cases duplicates are bound in the same book with the originals. A number of the duplicate volumes have been checked with their originals, and in every case materials have been found in the duplicate books that did not appear in the books of originals. In some cases these materials are comments by the secretary on despatches received; in other cases they are inclosures that did not seem suitable for binding with the special papers on the subject; in a few cases at the end of a duplicate despatch appears a postscript not added to the original, evidently appended because the duplicate despatch was copied and sent by a later ship than the original. These differences have indicated the necessity for examination of all duplicate books, in order that no material may be missed.

The following table may be of service in indicating the amount of material, before 1840. under each country.

Volumes of Diplomatic Papers before 1840, Bureau of Indexes and Archives, Department of State.

Names of series and number of volumes in each to 1840	Despatches		Notes to Department		Instructions		Notes from Department	
	Begin	Vols.	Begin	Vols.	Begin	Vols.	Begin	Vols.
Unclassified, ...21	.....	.....	Oct. 15, 1794	1	Jan. 23, 1791	15	May 5, 1810	5
Argentine Republic.. 7	Apr. 26, 1817	5	Dec. 9, 1818	1	.....	.....	Sept. 28, 1838	1
Austria 3	June 6, 1837	1	Nov. 8, 1820	1	June 7, 1837	1	.....	.....
Barbary Powers..... 1	.....	.....	.....	.....	July 1, 1834	1	.....	.....
Belgium 4	Aug. 20, 1819	1	Jan. 3, 1832	1	Apr. 14, 1832	1	July 1, 1834	1
Brazil 17	Apr. 3, 1809	13	Apr. 5, 1824	2	May 29, 1833	1	Oct. 22, 1834	1
Central America..... 2	.....	.....	.....	.....	May 15, 1824	2	.....	.....
Chile..... 8	Oct. 15, 1818	5	Feb. 19, 1828	1	May 29, 1833	1	Nov. 6, 1834	1
Colombia 13	Mar. 14, 1820	9	Apr. 8, 1820	2	May 29, 1833	1	May 18, 1835	1
Denmark 7	Feb. 22, 1811	3	Dec. 10, 1802	2	Mar. 28, 1833	1	July 1, 1834	1
Ecuador 1	.....	.....	Oct. 21, 1839	1	.....	.....	.....	.....
France 46	Sept. 30, 1789	34	Mar. 18, 1801	10	July 20, 1829	1	July 1, 1834	1
Germany 7	Oct. 22, 1800	3	Apr. 3, 1816	2	Apr. 20, 1835	1	July 1, 1834	1
Great Britain.....67	Nov. 29, 1791	46	Sept. 2, 1791	19	July 20, 1829	1	July 1, 1834	1
Italy 6	Nov. 7, 1831	1	July 19, 1826	2	May 2, 1838	2	Aug. 2, 1834	1
Mexico 15	Apr. 29, 1809	9	Mar. 1, 1816	4	May 29, 1833	1	July 1, 1834	1
Netherlands 21	Aug. 15, 1792	17	Aug. 17, 1799	2	Jan. 29, 1833	1	July 1, 1834	1
Paraguay and Uruguay 1	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	July 7, 1834	1
Peru..... 6	Mar. 20, 1826	5	.....	.....	May 29, 1833	1	.....	.....
Portugal 19	July 31, 1790	14	May 8, 1816	3	Apr. 18, 1833	1	July 1, 1834	1
Russia 19	Sept. 20, 1808	13	Jan. 16, 1801	4	Jan. 2, 1833	1	July 1, 1834	1
Spain 46	Oct. 14, 1790	34	Aug. 22, 1794	10	Mar. 12, 1833	1	July 1, 1834	1
Sweden and Norway..11	Aug. 21, 1812	6	Mar. 25, 1793	3	May 31, 1834	1	July 1, 1834	1
Texas 4	July 18, 1836	1	Mar. 2, 1836	1	May 21, 1837	1	July 11, 1836	1
Turkey,.....10	June 1, 1817	9	.....	.....	Dec. 20, 1820	1	.....	.....
Venezuela..... 4	Mar. 24, 1835	1	Feb. 24, 1835	1	Mar. 18, 1835	1	July 7, 1834	1
Total, 366								

The most puzzling difficulty in the use of the material is in locating the earliest material under each country. If one goes to volume 1 of any series he can not be sure that he has found the earliest papers from that country. In the case of Instructions and Notes from the Department, the first volume will be found numbered one only under countries with which diplomatic relations were entered upon comparatively late; for example, Austria Instructions begin with volume 1, June 7, 1837, while Barbary Powers Instructions begin with volume 14, July 1, 1834. The reason for this is that the first instructions to Barbary Powers are found in the first thirteen volumes of unclassified instructions. The correspondence for any one country began to be segregated and bound in a separate series as the relations with the country developed and its importance increased. This fact is indicated by the dates at which the separate series begin, as shown in the table on p. 9. The number of the first volume of Instructions or Notes from the Department in the separate series for any country follows the number of the last volume of unclassified Instructions or Notes from the Department in which similar papers for the same country appear.

For the purpose of discovering the character and value of the archives, I have made a special examination of certain periods and of the despatches of certain persons, and have made a careful comparison between the amount of the unpublished matter and the amount of printed matter. The result of this examination can not be put accurately in a few words, nor can reference be made to all the important fields where significant correspondence is unprinted, but the general statements that follow will serve as illustrations and as an indication of the value of the unprinted materials.

The *State Papers* contain very full correspondence in the early years of the government from Gouverneur Morris, who was appointed in 1789 as agent of the government to ascertain the "sentiments and intentions of the court at London" concerning the fulfilment of the treaty of peace and the formation of a treaty of commerce. Morris afterward went to France, and, as is well known, his letters from the continent are full of valuable information. Monroe's despatches during his stay as minister in France are also given at considerable length. The same is true of the correspondence concerning the formation of Jay's treaty.* But during these important years we have other sources

*Among the unprinted papers on this subject is a significant letter from Jay, September 13, 1794, speaking of the work of Monroe in Paris, and intimating that the activity of that unseasoned diplomat was increasing the difficulties of the English mission. (See No. V, below.)

of information concerning European and American conditions which have not seen the light. This is true of the despatches of Thomas Pinckney, who was sent to Great Britain as the first minister after the establishment of the new government. His experiences were far from being unimportant or lacking in interest. They were scarcely less trying, though not quite so dramatic as the experiences of John Adams, who, soon after the war, went to London, with the hope of making a treaty of commerce and settling the difficulties that had already arisen in connection with the treaty of 1783. Pinckney was not so good or so profuse a letter-writer as Adams, but his despatches well repay reading. In the *State Papers* there are some fifteen letters from Pinckney, written during his residence in London and before the beginning of his Spanish mission; in the archives of the Department are found two hundred and seventy letters, including letters from his secretary and inclosures in the way of notes and other papers. Some of these are not important, but others are of conspicuous interest.

Again, the despatches covering the X. Y. Z. correspondence are pretty fully printed, as are the despatches of William Vans Murray from The Hague, and the negotiations preceding the close of the difficulty with France by the treaty of 1800. There are some subjects of this kind concerning which we have practically full information, but it must be said that as a rule in almost every period of particular interest new materials can be found in the archives, and some of this material is of the greatest value. Even on the most salient episodes in our history, the diplomatic records are not printed in full, and sometimes there are considerable bodies of valuable material as yet unpublished. When we remember how much of our national history turned upon foreign relations from the establishment of the government to the end of the War of 1812, we see at once the desirability of having at hand every scrap of evidence for understanding those critical twenty-five years during which America was harassed on every side—by France and England on the ocean, by the combatants on the European continent, by the Spanish on the frontier, and by the Indians, who, rightly or wrongly, we believed to be influenced much of the time by the emissaries of Europe. And yet even during that period much of the most important material remains unprinted in the archives of the Department of State.

No episode in our history is of greater significance than the Louisiana purchase, but this, of course, was only the outcome of years of important events—indeed, one might more properly call the purchase an incident, though an important one, in the southwestern question,

which, of course, did not end with 1803, but continued in one form or another till the treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo (1848). For the study of this question we have insufficient material in the published papers. The history of the question from the outbreak of the Revolution to the beginning of 1787 is fairly well understood. It is ably and properly discussed in various places, and forms a portion of almost every book covering the period. It is not unlikely that a study of the Spanish archives, and a publication of the Gardoqui correspondence, copies of which are, I believe, in this country, would give us new information on this whole field. But at any rate the treatment of the Mississippi question, down to the time when the attempt at forming a treaty was abandoned by Jay in 1787, is understood and receives intelligent and adequate treatment in our general histories. Part of the reason for this is that the diplomatic correspondence for that time is in print in the seven volumes entitled *The Diplomatic Correspondence, 1783-1789* (reprinted in three volumes in 1837).

But for the period from 1789 to 1803 by no means all the material in the State Department archives illustrating our relations with France and Spain is in print. Unfortunately for our knowledge of conditions in Spain, until William Short went there in December, 1792,* we are dependent for some years on the information supplied by William Carmichael, who was strangely uncommunicative. His despatches to the government were so infrequent that one is at a loss to understand why he was retained so long in the public service. On such a question we can get no light from any private or semi-public correspondence which we might hope to find outside of the Department, for all of Carmichael's papers seem to have disappeared. Though he long held important diplomatic positions, the despatches from him in the archives are very few in number. Jefferson seemed to believe that Carmichael's letters were surreptitiously disposed of in transit, but it is doubtful whether Carmichael wrote except with amazing infrequency. On April 11, 1791, Jefferson, writing from Philadelphia, acknowledged a letter of January 24, 1791, which, he s[illegible]s the first received from Carmichael since the receipt of one [illegible]lay 6, 1789. Between March, 1785, and April, 1791, Carmicha[illegible]nt [illegible]en instructions, and in answer to these Carmichael se[illegible]ne March 14, 1786, and one December 6, 1[illegible] February 9, 1795.

Fortunately Sho[illegible]rom the time he went to Madrid until [illegible]ith the purpose

*These despatches [illegible] The and Spain, 1792-1795."

of bringing the elusive court of Spain to the formal acknowledgment of our southern boundary, we get very full and apparently accurate information as to the conditions in that country and its attitude toward the problem of making a treaty. His correspondence is full of interest, for it contains information concerning not only the main issue between Spain and America, but concerning the course of hostilities in Europe and the movements in European politics and diplomacy. Practically nothing of Short's correspondence is printed; it forms, at least, a necessary preface to Pinckney's despatches, and shows how hard it was to get Spain to come to the point of discussing the situation seriously so long as procrastination seemed to aid rather than to imperil her cause. It will be remembered that Pinckney finally brought the Prince of Peace to terms by demanding his passports and making ostensible, if not real, preparations for leaving the country. In Short's despatches from Spain during those critical years there are 140,000 words; that is to say, a whole printed book, almost as large as one of the volumes of McMaster's *History of the People of the United States*, and I think I am right in saying that this material is practically unknown to American or foreign historical investigators.

When the every-day American was entirely dependent for information as to European affairs on the knowledge he could gather from the meager columns of the newspapers before the use of steamships or the invention of the telegraph, any first-hand information was, no doubt, welcomed with joy. The isolation of America is brought out with startling distinctness by the study of these papers. The ministers of the United States in foreign countries were dependent on their own resources, their own judgment, and their knowledge of the situation. Their instructions could not instruct them in reality, except in the most general way, and often they would not hear from the government of the United States for months.*

The foreign ministers sent information as to political and sometimes as to social conditions in Europe—budgets of news that must have been eagerly read by the officials to whom they were addressed and doubtless by others also. Many of these letters are of marked value, and probably all students of European history would be much interested in the accounts given by these spectators of what was happening on the continent. Certainly their comments would be quite as well

*This again is well illustrated by the embarrassing experience of Short, who was informed of Pinckney's appointment to Madrid, and then was left for months without one word of information as to when Pinckney was to come to take charge of the negotiations.

worth reading as are the letters and reminiscences of most foreign diplomats, which are sometimes printed and often used by the student and reader of European history. As to the real historical trustworthiness of these letters, one can not speak with assurance. The ministers felt quite at liberty to give gossip and send rumor, though they often, if not invariably, distinguished mere rumor from the facts that they gathered from the public gazettes or from conversation and observation. No student of history would dare to pass on the availability and credibility of letters of this kind until after testing them pretty thoroughly; each letter would naturally need examination in connection with the facts discussed. Of all the letters examined describing European conditions and movements, perhaps the most striking are those of William Short, John Quincy Adams, Jonathan Russell, and Benjamin Rush. But I do not pretend to pass on them all or to say that there are not many other ministers whose communications contain material quite as valuable for the illumination of European history and of the fluctuating stages of diplomacy.

The volume of letters sent by William Short from Paris from September, 1789, to November, 1790, is full of interest for all students of the French Revolution (see Nos. I-IV, below). The letters are well written and are evidently the work of a thoughtful man who was deeply interested in the course of the Revolution, and kept careful watch of its progress. Here, as elsewhere, it is necessary, of course, to distinguish between actual fact and the reports that the ministers transmitted to Congress, but his descriptions of debates in the National Assembly, his accounts of scenes in the streets of Paris, his tracing of the rise and fall of popular enthusiasm, can scarcely be far from right. We get from these letters a vivid narrative of the course of the Revolution for thirteen critical months. In addition there is constant reference to the commercial relations between France and America, to the American prisoners in Algiers, to the threatened war between Spain and England over the Nootka Sound trouble, to the conditions in the Netherlands and Belgium, to the conduct of Lafayette and Mirabeau, to the apparent popularity or unpopularity of the leading characters, to the constantly varying opinions and passions of the people, to the purposes and the behavior of the king and queen, and to the sufferings of the émigrés. The second volume of Short's letters from Paris begins March 30, 1791, and ends in August, 1792. It is full of entertaining information. His descriptions are, no doubt, once again based in part on rumor, but he evidently was an eye-witness of much, and he had the faculty of rec[illegible]ng in a most entertaining fashion the events

which attracted his attention and which he thought would interest the American government.

Any one that has ever read a letter from the pen of John Quincy Adams will be prepared to hear that his European despatches are full, graphic, keen, and entertaining. First, we have two volumes of unprinted despatches written by Adams while he was minister to the Netherlands, running from July, 1794, to April, 1798. Among these is to be found his report on a mission to London in 1795. There is next a little volume of letters written from Berlin during the latter part of 1800 and the early months of 1801 (October to June). This volume contains eighteen interesting letters on the European situation of the time, and I presume it may be safely conjectured that the student of the Napoleonic period will not find these despatches dull. It is certainly interesting to the average reader to see the events of the day through the eyes of such a keen observer. The succession of events in Europe and the general industrial and military situation were naturally of considerable moment to the Americans of 1800; the students of American history are necessarily interested in knowing not only what was taking place abroad, but also the supposed facts, strategic purposes, and diplomatic probabilities disclosed by the despatches of our foreign representatives, constituting the knowledge on which our government could form its own judgments. Below will be found one of the letters from Berlin (No. VI). I have chosen it because it shows so well the interests of the United States in the European struggle.

Of greater interest are the despatches of John Quincy Adams from St. Petersburg, Paris, and Ghent. It will be remembered that Adams went to Russia as minister in 1809, and that he did not return until after peace was framed. There are three volumes of his despatches filed with Russian despatches, though a portion of the letters were written from Paris and a good many from Ghent. In the first volume we find 122 letters, practically all unprinted, and in the second volume 167 letters, largely unprinted. The third also contains much unpublished material of interest; it is taken up with the work of the joint commissioners in St. Petersburg. The letters, written with regularity, describe with care every move in the great diplomatic and martial game that was playing to a finish in Europe. The condition of Russia, the opinions of Austria's plans and purposes, the character and ambitions of Napoleon, the formation of the new combinations to check his victorious career, the effect of the disastrous retreat from Moscow, are here told in long and able letters, written with literary skill and with the freedom and abandon one might expect from the younger Adams.

We get, in fact, from this correspondence a vivid contemporary history of five years of the Napoleonic wars, a history at times based on surmise and conjecture, it is true, but bringing the situation before us with remarkable distinctness. Any one of these letters might be selected and printed in this pamphlet as an illustration of the kind of historical material that lies concealed in these archives, but I have chosen the one commenting on the retreat of Napoleon from Moscow (No. VII).

Adams had the task in hand of discussing with the court of Russia the reasons for America's entering the war and was also later concerned with the proposition of Russian mediation. The reports of his interviews have therefore evident value in American diplomatic history. We should naturally be more surprised, however, to find that not even all the American materials for a study of the treaty of Ghent are at hand in print. It is hard to see how any set of despatches could touch us more closely than the series sent by Adams during the dreary waiting at Ghent (see Nos. VIII-X, below). Perhaps we can see by reading these why the United States was willing to accept a peace that did not essentially settle the objects of the war, and why the commissioners were ready to close hostilities by signing such a treaty. By studying such despatches as these of Adams we get an idea of the persistent fight England made against Napoleon's power, of the continuing interest of the United States, of how England finally brought America to a stage of exasperation and desperation, and of the position of tremendous importance that England occupied after the first overthrow of Napoleon.

It may seem a strange assertion that we have nowhere in print the most necessary despatches for an understanding of the events immediately preceding the War of 1812. These despatches were seemingly used by Henry Adams in preparing his *History of the United States*; for he makes reference to a few of them. Many of the most interesting are, however, not in print, either in Adams's history or in the *State Papers*. And yet any one wishing to see vividly the causes of the war must turn to these papers. They bring sharply before us the complexities of the situation, and give us a new view of the intricate diplomacy of those perplexing days, when America was trying hard to believe that Napoleon had withdrawn his vexatious decrees, when England, feeling the force of the non-intercourse acts, was evidently trying to be as fair as a consuming [illegible] of France and a distrust of Napoleon would allow, and when the French was willing to make bland promises to our [illegible] entangle England in new difficulties. The [illegible] from France, January

4, 1810, to October 29, 1811, give a great deal of information about Napoleon's relations to American commerce (see No. XI, below), while the published letters deal only with attempts to discover violations of the decree revoking the Berlin and Milan decrees. Not being willing to declare openly his disbelief in Napoleon's assurances, Russell still shows by his despatches strong evidences of doubt. His despatches of November 17, 1810, December 4, 1810, March 15 and March 25, 1811, are in this matter especially illuminating. Noteworthy also are Russell's repeated protests regarding treatment of American ships and seamen (March 4 and following), and the frequency with which he wrote on the copies of his notes to the French minister the telling words "not answered."

Russell's discussions with Castlereagh before the announcement in England that war had begun are of marked interest; some are not printed at all; of others only extracts are printed. The letters of Joel Barlow from Paris at the critical juncture of affairs, September 29, 1811, to November 23, 1812, are rather fully published, though some interesting ones have been omitted. In the *State Papers* (III, 405-434) will be found the despatches submitted to Congress from November 5, 1811, to November 4, 1812, referring to the relations between England and the United States. Many of these are not printed in full. An exceedingly interesting example of the way the material is used in the old *State Papers* appears in the documents that follow (see Nos. XII, XIII, below). A good illustration and not an extreme instance is the despatch of March 20, 1812. It covers over eight pages of foolscap paper, and contains much valuable information; but from this letter there appears in the *State Papers* (III, 427) only, "I had the honor to address you on the 4th instant, giving a brief account of the debate in the House of Commons on the preceding evening. Since then, no change in relation to us has taken place here." Of course, Russell all through these days was a false reader of political signs, perhaps blinded for a time with prejudice, for, as we know, the ministry really were preparing to withdraw the obnoxious orders in council.

The materials on the recognition of the South American republics appear printed at considerable length in the *State Papers,* but there is much of great value unprinted. Of this I need give no example. An examination of the references in Mr. Paxson's book, *The Independence of the South American Republics,* will enable one to see the kind of material not in print. As for the material leading up to the announcement of the Monroe doctrine, there is considerable that bears plainly on that question. The discussions between Rush and Castlereagh, and

those between Rush and Canning, are the most important. There is a series of very important despatches from Rush, some of which are known, but almost all of which are not printed in the *State Papers*. Of these, nearly all have recently been printed in an appendix to Hamilton's edition of the *Writings of James Monroe* (VI, 356-419). These letters, showing the marked capacity of Rush and his full statements of the American position, his independence and soundness of judgment, as well as the position of England, are of extreme interest. These despatches certainly prove that Rush was one of our ablest diplomatists and indicate how well the interests of the United States were cared for under the guidance of Adams and Rush during eight critical years.

One series of papers, of the existence of which American historical students do not seem to have been aware, though, of course, they may have been used by some investigators without my knowledge, contains the diplomatic correspondence with Texas from the time when we acknowledged Texan independence to the time of admission of the state—more accurately, from May 21, 1837, to October 11, 1845. There are altogether six volumes, and a careful examination justifies an estimate that they contain 390,000 words. The Congressional series of executive documents contains considerable Texan material, but most of these papers refer to questions of boundary, to attempts to maintain neutrality in the war between Texas and Mexico, Indian depredations, trade relations, and matters of that kind. But the printed reports contain very little on the really important question of annexation or on the diplomatic and political relations between Texas and the United States. The archives, on the other hand, naturally contain much valuable information and will be of service to the historian of the political, social, or industrial events and conditions of that period. The volume of instructions contains very important letters from Upshur, Calhoun, and Buchanan, which are very necessary for the proper understanding of the events leading to annexation. The number of instructions, however, is not large; there is one volume of fair copies, containing 131 documents in 129 folio pages. Most of the instructions, however, are dated comparatively late in the history of the Texan question, and throw light on the later negotiations. The despatches from our ministers in Texas are contained in two large volumes, containing about 450 different communicati nd are, like the instructions, exceedingly valuable. They de l and industrial conditions in Texas, the course o exas and Mexico, the attitude of the Texans tow nd the sentiment of annexation. They s Texas and the European powers, the co ngland might join hands,

the question of boundary, and the steps taken for final annexation by the United States. Very few of these despatches have been printed. Some of the letters, of course, are not of historical significance, but others are of unusual interest. Notes to the Texas legation are not very many or of much interest; doubtless most of the communications were oral. There are two very instructive volumes of notes sent by the Texan representatives to the State Department during eight years. The character and value of this Texan correspondence may well be indicated by the fact that they were found a few years ago to contain among other things the original draft of the Texan Declaration of Independence from Mexico, which on application of the governor of Texas was transferred to the keeping of Texas as properly belonging to that state and not to the nation. Of special interest, perhaps, are the papers written during 1843, 1844, and 1845, after the accession of Upshur to the secretaryship and the final admission of the state* (see XIV, XV, below). Attention should likewise be called to the papers, not far from five hundred in number, now in the Bureau of Rolls and Library; they are the archives of the United States legation in Texas, which were transferred to Washington after Texas ceased to be a foreign state.

I have in the preceding pages given but a faint idea of the amount and character of the valuable historical papers contained in the diplomatic correspondence.† The more explicit statements I have given are only for the purpose of illustration. Below will be found a few documents chosen for the purpose of indicating the character of the material. They will illustrate in some measure (1) the kind of material not published in the *State Papers*; (2) that even when a series of papers relating to a particular subject has been printed, important documents are often omitted; and (3) that when extracts of documents are printed, the omitted portions are often of great historical value and contain information which no longer need be kept from the public eye. In these letters the original spelling, punctuation, and arrangement has been carefully followed, with two exceptions: "and" has been substituted for the figure &; and superior letters in abbreviations have been printed on the line. In some cases a misspelled word has been explained in a foot-note; in others the correct word is so evident that no explanation has been thought necessary.

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*Some of the important papers accompany Polk's message of December, 1845. These are not referred to under "Texas" in Ferrell's *Congressional Document Index*. See Sen. Doc. 1, 29 Cong., 1 sess.

†For an outline sketch of the entire archives of the Department of State, see *Guide to the Archives of the Government of the United States in Washington*, by C. H. Van Tyne and W. G. Leland, 1904, pages 2-31.

ILLUSTRATIVE DOCUMENTS.

I. WILLIAM SHORT TO JOHN JAY.

(Despatches, France, Volume 1, Despatch No. 2.)

PARIS October 9th. 1789.

Sir.

I had the honor of announcing to you in a letter of the 30th. of September the departure of Mr. Jefferson from this place. a letter from him of the 8th. instant informs me that he was detained at Havre by contrary winds.

Within these few days events of a very extraordinary and unexpected nature have taken place here. Three weeks ago a Regiment of Infantry had been ordered to Versailles. their arrival there was cause of Jealousy to the French guards who have acted a considerable part in this revolution, and who instead of the post they formerly occupied near the King's person are now in the pay of the City of Paris under the appellation of National guards. the distressing scarcity of bread which has continued here for some time had excited among the people much discontent and uneasiness. in this state of the minds of the soldiery and people, which it is apprehended designing persons wished to make use of, accounts were brought from Versailles of an entertainment given by the gardes du corps to the officers of the regiment of infantry. reports were printed and circulated in a number of inflammatory gazettes of circumstances having taken place at this entertainment which shewed designs unfriendly to present measures. this sufficed in these times of alarm and suspicion to create a considerable degree of fermentation; and on Sunday evening the 4th. inst. large crowds assembled in the Palais Royale in a tumultuous manner. detachments of the guard were sent there and patrolled the garden; they did not attempt to disperse the people, as they had proceeded to no excess except in words. the night separated the crowd. as the same movements of the Palais Royal had taken place on other occasions and died away of themselves, this did not give particular alarm. However on monday morning large crowds assembled on the place de Greve— the greater part were women; who now took the lead. they forced

the Hotel de Ville, the guard not thinking it proper to use violence in their resistance. little or no disorder was committed by these women, and they seem to have had no particular object in entering—the chest of money which was opened and shewed to them was left untouched. a reinforcement was sent to the guard who by degrees and peaceable measures recovered possession of the Hotel de Ville. from hence they ran through the streets forcing many of their sex of a different order whom they met with in their way to join them—the cry now became general *à Versailles, à Versailles*—their numbers amounted to five or six thousand, many of them armed with swords, and thus began their procession to Versailles without having any determinate object.—the departure of this procession increased the tumult which still continued on the Place de Greve.—The mob and regiment of French or National guards, united in insisting that the Marquis de la Fayette should lead them to Versailles—their clamours were increased by people who circulated reports in the crowd, that the King was about to retire to Metz, where there is a numerous garrison—the situation of the Marquis thus became the most critical that can be imagined. had he refused absolutely to go, he would have lost the confidence of the French guards (who had for some time been plotting an expedition to Versailles to recover their former post of honor in guarding the King) and would have become an immediate victim to the people assembled on the Place de Greve, and already furious on account of the delay—in consenting to march he had before him the prospect of finding on his arrival that the women who had gone off in the morning had been attacked by the gardes du corps and regiment of infantry at Versailles, in that case, it would have been impossible for him to have withheld his troops and much less the thousands of furious and enraged people who followed him armed with pikes and spears, from commencing a scene which must be left to be conceived, in considering that the King and his family as well as the National Assembly were on the spot. Monsieur de la Fayette finding it impossible to resist any longer this torrent which had been hitherto arrested by his coolness and address alone, sat out between five and six o'clock in the evening at the head of the greater part of the troops under his command.

The women who had gone off in the morning arrived at Versailles just as the Assembly was rising. their arrival carried with it dismay—the streets were crowded with people who fled on all parts—the Members who were going out returned to their stations as to an Asylum—they were immediately followed by numbers of these women who cried out *du pain, du pain.* they were answered that the Assembly had been

deliberating on that article, and that the King was about to give orders in consequence. they left the Assembly to go in person to the King—a deputation of them was received by him and informed that measures had been taken to secure the supplies of Paris.

As night approached the crowd and confusion increased: The troops consisting of the gardes du corps, the regiment of infantry and the garde Bourgeoise of Versailles all under the command of the Count D'Estaing, were drawn up in front of the Chateau—a scattering fire took place, not known how, between the gardes du corps and the people—several were wounded on both sides.—between nine and ten o'clock, the troops which had been thus drawn up were ordered to retire to their quarters, in order to prevent any similar accidents.

When the Members who had seperated for dinner returned to the Assembly in the evening they found the room occupied by immense crowds of women who filled the galleries and most of the seats of the members; some singing, some dancing, others crying out *du pain,* and many of them with swords hanging to their sides. In this confusion it was impossible to proceed regularly to business; still the members continued assembled—a part of a deputation they had sent to the King returned bringing with them his *acceptation pure and simple* of the articles of the constitution and Bill of rights which had been sent to him some days before, and to which by his answer received in the morning, he had only acceded *conditionally.*

In this situation the Marquis de la Fayette approached Versailles, about 11 o'clock at night. although on leaving Paris he was the prisoner of his troops and the mob which followed them, before his arrival he had obtained such a command over them that notwithstanding the impetuosity of the multitude he was able to halt them and make them swear Allegiance to the National Assembly and to the King before entering the town. This was the more necessary because* it was suspected a party attached to the Duke of Orleans had been tampering with his troops [not deciphered] and the mob and also because his designs in his present singular situation might have been liable to suspicion both to the King and the Assembly.

M. de la Fayette leaving his troops thus halted went alone to the King, who after assuring him of the entire confidence which he placed in his loyalty and honor, agreed to be guarded in future by the national troops under his command. the posts around the Chateau which they had formerly occupied were immediately delivered to them, and from

*From "because" to "Assembly" appears in the original in cipher.

that moment their conduct was most exemplary—the remainder of the night was employed in keeping order amongst the thousands of people who continued flocking there from Paris. At six o'clock in the morning (of tuesday) M. de la Fayette worn down by the fatigues of the preceding day and night, retired to repose himself—during his absence the mob became ungovernable—they fired on and killed the gardes du corps wherever they could find them—some of them in their flight were pursued into the Queen's Antichamber. She was awakened by the cries of death and fled into the chamber of the King, who had been also roused by the noise of immense crouds surrounding and running up and down the Chateau. M. de la Fayette, whose conduct on this occasion has acquired him from all parties the appellation of the guardian angel of the day, was immediately called up. the first objects which presented themselves to his view were the heads of two of the gardes du corps which the people were carrying on pikes through the streets in triumph—numbers of others about to become victims to the rage of the moment were rescued by him from slaughter—it is not yet ascertained how many fell.—The large court in front of the Chateau was now filled with the furious multitude. The King shewed himself to them from the terrace of his chamber—they insisted with loud cries that he should go to remain at Paris. he consented and added that he would carry the Queen and his family. it was not known how this would be received by them—fortunately it was answered with shouts of joy—this became the signal of universal reconciliation.

The national Assembly being immediately informed of this decision of the King, resolved that they considered themselves as inseparable from his Majesty for the present Session and sent to inform him of their resolution to follow him to Paris. About twelve o'clock the King and Royal Family accompanied by a deputation of the national assembly left Versailles. they were preceded and followed by the troops of Paris, and the crowds which had been pressing there during all this time from the capital—at eight o'clock they arrived at the Hotel de Ville and were received there in great order by the Mayor and Commons of Paris, notwithstanding the confusion which might have been expected. from thence they went to lodge at the Chateau of the Thuilleries.—From this moment a calm reigned through all the streets which seemed to have been the effect of Magic, and the next morning to the astonishment of every body bread became as abundant as ever and has continued so since. this confirms the opinion that the scarcity was not real—there are many suspicions on this subject among all parties—but I see nothing like proof on any side—a number of people

however are arrested on suspicion of having mischievous designs in stirring up the populace—it is said also that large parcels of bread have been found thrown into the river in order to starve the people of Paris and thus render them ripe for revolt.—time alone can shew the truth of these things—one thing however which is certain is that if the late scarcity of bread should return, the effects of popular rage would be more than ever to be dreaded, as the king and particularly the queen will in that case be absolutely in the hands of a mob who in times of famine will be too strong for the guards.* I fear, Sir, I may have taken up too much of your time by the particularity of these details. but I thought it would be proper to lay under your view with minuteness the rise and progress of an event so singular in itself, and which must be so influential as well on the present deliberations of the national assembly as the future operations of government. It is not yet known what effect it will have in the provinces. the conjectures on this subject are various according [to] the views and party of the person who forms them. it being certain that it will be unsafe to deliver any other than the most popular sentiments in the Assembly whilst in Paris, it would seem as if the constituents of the other parts of the Kingdom might have just cause of complaint. but I am assured by members of information that so large a majority in all the provinces are consentaneous with the people of Paris that no reclamations are to be apprehended. The King has written to day a letter to the Assembly at Versailles in which he informs them that the proofs of affection and fidelity which he has received from the inhabitants of Paris have induced him to fix his residence here, and desires they will name commissioners to chuse a proper place for their meeting in the Capital—they will continue their deliberations at Versailles untill a place shall be prepared for them here. The objects which occupy them at present are the remaining articles of the constitution and a provisory change in their criminal procedure. I mentioned to you, Sir in my letter of September 30th. that the Assembly was taking measures in consequence of the plan then proposed to them by Mr. Necker on the subject of their finances—they have since enacted his plan into a Law and drawn up the address to their constituents in consequence of it, which I have the honor to inclose you. It is entirely of the composition Count de Mirabeau who was chosen for that purpose by the [redacted] of his unrivalled eloquence.

*Portions of this senter

A political event of considerable moment is talked of as certainly to take place. it is said that England, Prussia and Holland have united to separate from the house of Austria their possessions in the Netherlands, and to render them independent—it is added that the Dutch and Prussian armies are already formed for that object. those who are supposed to be in the secret of these Cabinets say that this event will shew itself fully in the course of the next month. The Emperor has about 12,000 troops in those provinces—they will probably make no resistance against the general ill humour and projected insurrection of the inhabitants supported by the Prussian and Dutch forces and English gold. An account has just arrived here also of the Imperial army which crossed the Danube on the 11th and 12th. of Septr. in order to begin the siege of Belgrade having obtained a considerable advantage over the Turks.

I am assured that the premium on the importation of wheat and flour is prolonged to December; but I have no official information of it, and I do not think it worth while to attempt to see the Minister on the subject in the present confusion, as the period is too short to have any influence on American supplies. As this letter goes by Post it will not be accompanied by the Gazettes of France and Leyden nor the Debates of the Assembly. I shall reserve them for a private hand. In the mean time, I beg you to be assured Sir of the profound respect with which I have the honor to be. Your most obt. humble Servant.

W.[ILLIAM] S[HORT].

II. William Short to John Jay.

(Despatches, France, Volume 1, Despatch No. 19.)

PARIS Feb. 10. 1790.

Dear Sir.

Since my last an event which has been expected for some time has taken place. On the 4th. inst. the King went to the Assembly and addressed them in a speech which I have the honor of inclosing—the object is to put himself at the head as it were of the revolution, and thus to remove all the doubts and fears of its friends. and destroy the hopes of those who might wish to bring back the ancient order of things.—those who advised this measure had also in view the propriety of the King's taking some step which should contradict the assertions of those who insisted that he was not free and subscribed at present to the constitution only by force.—During the delivery of the speech, rage and despair were marked on the faces of a few of that class who are opposed to the revolution and who never believed till

then that all hopes of a return to the former government were lost— a kind of discontent also was observable with some of those who are for carrying the revolution to a visionary degree, and who are consequently the enemies of whatever tends to stop it at present—they are also the enemies of M: Necker and criticise the speech, of which he is the author, in saying that it is filled with the praises of his administration which were exaggerated, and misplaced on that occasion—these two extremes of the assembly being excepted, the measure taken by the King produced a degree of enthusiasm on all present of which there are few examples—he was followed to his palace by a deputation of the assembly and by the shouts and acclamations of thousands of his subjects—the Queen with the Dauphin received the King and the deputation of the assembly—she addressed the deputation in a short but popular speech—this was reported to the assembly and recieved with the loudest applauses by all the members and spectators present.—It was proposed that each member should separately take the oath which you will see on the paper inclosed—this was done by all present except three—the *suppliants* and the deputies of the chambers of commerce, and spectators all solicited the assembly to be admitted to take the same oath, which they did by all holding out the hand at the same time and answering to the oath read to them. "Je le Jure."—this enthusiasm passed in the instant from the assembly to the Hotel de ville where the commons of Paris were assembled—the oath was immediately taken there—and since that every day has been employed by the districts and troops as well regular as militia in taking it.—The same flame will certainly spread through the provinces—where it is to be hoped it will put an end to the violences and disorders which are committing in several of them against the persons and property of the nobles disaffected to the Revolution.

It was hoped that this measure would be useful to the public credit, but the stocks continue falling—I own it appears to me an extraordinary circumstance the domains and ecclesiastical property of which the nation is to have the disposal and which it is known will be sold for the payment of the national debt, are such a mass of wealth that it was natural to hope they alone would have re-established public credit.—still this diminishes every day. It is said that the conferences begun at Iassy between the Imperial and Ottoman ministers have ceased—it is not known however with certainty; but nothing effectual towards peace is expected from them at present——Preparations are publicly making for war in Prussia—the army is forming with rapidity in Poland—and a proof that the Emperor does not consider the Turk

as his most dangerous enemy is that the Baron de Laudhon* is not to command the army against them in the ensuing campaign, for which the two Imperial courts are making active preparations.

The affairs in the low countries present two faces—with respect to the Emperor he seems to have abandoned all except Luxemburgh—the citadel is impregnable to undisciplined troops, and the province is attached to the Emperor at present by his promise to exempt them from taxes during twenty years—the other face shews these countries divided among themselves and unable to agree on a constitution which can be permanent. The Duke D'Ursel and the family of D'Aremberg† by far the most powerful in that country have put themselves at the head of the popular party—their design is to determine that the sovereignty belongs to the people at large—the Nobles and Clergy insist that the sovereignty devolved on them, viz—les Etats—on the forfeiture of the Emperor—they are as yet the strongest and are supported by Prussia and Holland. The Duke D'Ursel had been appointed chief of the military department—a Prussian general, M. de Schonfeld‡ being lately added to him he has given up his employment—this is considered as a victory of the States over the popular party—the present conjectures are that the States, i. e. the clergy and Noblesse have entered into secret engagements with Prussia and Holland—and that one of the objects is to unite the Belgick with the Dutch provinces under the Stadhouderat of the house of Orange—England in this case must have some compensation given her—and various conjectures are formed on the subject—if such engagements are taken they must soon come to light, as the commencement of the campaign will necessarily point out the object of it.

Not being able to send the papers as mentioned in my last I add to them at present those which have come out since together with the first report of the committee of judicature and send them by a private conveyance to Havre to day. Supposing they will be longer going than the Post I forward this letter with its inclosures by it.—Among the papers abovementioned there is the Compte generale des finances, etc. for the Secretary of the treasury. I have received from London the President's speech on the opening of Congress. Having not yet heard of your quitting the department of foreign affairs I take the liberty of continuing to address my letters to you, and am happy in having an opportunity of repeating to you Sir, the assurances of respect and attachment with which I have the honor to be

Your most obedient humble servant

W SHORT.

*Laudon. †D'Arenberg. ‡Schoenfeld.

The inclosed are the papers mentioned in my No. 18—to which I have since added others—and among them the present general statement of the finances of this country for the Secretary of the Treasury as I suppose this packet will go with less expedition than a letter sent by post I make use of that conveyance for mine of to-day.

PARIS Feb. 10. 1790.

W[ILLIAM] SHORT.

III. WILLIAM SHORT TO JOHN JAY.

(Despatches, France, Volume 1, Despatch No. 32.)

PARIS May the 23d. 1790.

Dear Sir

The constitutional question of the *right of war and peace*, which I mentioned to you in my last, has occupied the assembly without interruption since that time. It was finally decided yesterday evening as you will see by the articles of the decree which I have the honor to inclose you. It seems to have given general satisfaction—The ministry and aristocratic party are contented because they feared that still less power would have been left to the King—The Demagogues of the assembly have the appearance of being satisfied, because it is a part of their plan to make the people of Paris believe that they triumph in the assembly. Consequently when they find themselves about to lose a question they adopt such parts of the opposite as engage on their side a sufficient number of the doubtful members to enable them to have the appearance of carrying their point. No debate has ever shewed these manœuvres with so much evidence, as that decided yesterday evening.

In the course of this long debate a great number of orators presented different shades of opinion—they may all however be resolved into three distinct classes—those who were for vesting every power relative to peace and war, treaties of alliance, and in fine whatever regarded foreign nations, in the hands of the Monarch—they were composed of the aristocratic party headed by the Abbé Maury and Cazales—those who were for excluding the monarch entirely from the power of peace and war, as being a portion of the public will which could be exercised only by the representatives of the people, without danger to their interests—they were headed by the two Lameths and Duport, members of the Noblesse, and Barnave a lawyer from Dauphiné—all of them young men of talents and who have for some time distinguished themselves as the Demagogues of the assembly—finally those whose opinions held a middle rank, who thought this part

of the sovereignty should be delegated concurrently to the executive and legislative body; or at least who supported that opinion from an idea that it was the best that could be carried at present—they were headed by the Marquis de la fayette, Mirabeau and Chapelier. There was no doubt that if the votes of the assembly were taken with calm and independence this latter opinion would triumph, a part of its opponents therefore tried to enlist on their side the people of Paris; it is suspected that money was distributed among them for that purpose. certain it is that in the crowds which assemble in the different parts of Paris several street orators were heard haranguing the people to point out to them the danger to which they would be exposed if the national assembly did not reserve to itself the right of war and peace—the present preparations for war were constantly quoted as a proof in point—it was said that the ministry had excited the court of Spain in order that an army being assembled, they might undertake a counter revolution. Other absurdities of a similar nature were circulated with industry and easily imposed on the credulity of the multitude—what alarmed them still more was the report that Mirabeau was gained over to the Ministry—unfortunately the moral character of this member whose talents are unrivalled, is no obstacle to such a report——When he delivered his opinion and proposed his decree two days ago his eloquence wrested applauses from all parties and particularly from the public galleries who are in the habit of expressing their satisfaction or discontent without restraint—but in the course of the night and the next day the people were inspired with the belief that he wished to vest the contested power in the hands of the Monarch—His speech was attacked with art, address, and eloquence by Barnave—the marks of approbation given by the galleries to this attack were without example and encouraged the orator to proceed to an indirect crimination of the Marquis de la fayette, who he knew would support Mirabeau's opinion, and from whose character and influence every thing was to be feared. In passing through the crowd assembled in the Tuilleries he was carried in triumph by them to his carriage—this was considered by many as the signal of the decline of the Marquis de la fayette's popularity and gave real alarm to all parties—because all agree, even those who are opposed to the revolution and consequently his enemies, that it is his influence alone which preserves the order and security which is enjoyed in the capital. The next day (yesterday) a pamphlet was cried in all the streets called *the treachery of the Count de Mirabeau,* and he instead of being the idol of the people, received marked proofs of their discontent on his way to the assembly. Notwithstand-

ing this he continued firm in his opinion, he answered the attack of Barnave, pulverized his arguments, and with a degree of eloquence of which there has been no example in the assembly, inveighed against the low and artful intrigues of his adversaries—he was applauded by the assembly, but not at all by the galleries who are the thermometer of the opinions of the people without doors—there were then greater crowds than had ever been seen in the Tuilleries—they shewed in their discourses menacing signs of displeasure, swore that Mirabeau was a traitor and should be hung to the lantern, and sometimes discovered even a desire to enter the assembly—In this situation of things the assembly proceeded by way of preliminary to decide, which of the three plans proposed should be first voted on.—The Marquis de la fayette who had not yet spoken, and who thought himself bound to give more than a silent vote on the question, made a short speech in favor of that proposed by Mirabeau, and supported the motion for its having the priority—Many who from their suspicions of Mirabeau feared there was treachery in his plan, adhered to it from their confidence in the Marquis de la fayette, so that the priority was granted it by a large majority—the leaders of the more popular party finding that the plan which had obtained the priority would certainly obtain also the preference of the assembly, and not chusing to have the appearance of having lost the victory, gave into the current of Mirabeau's decree with slight verbal alterations which they proposed—thus the several articles of the decree were passed without further opposition, and the crowds in the Tuilleries separated without disorder because they were informed by the demagogues of the assembly that the question had been decided agreeably to their wishes. It will be happy if the fermentation which has appeared among the people for these two or three days past should thus subside; but it is hardly to be expected, as it has been hitherto found much more easy to excite them than to check their movements when roused.

In the mean time preparations for equipping a fleet are going on with activity in the ports of this Kingdom, as well as Spain. In England the activity of their operations announces a real design of war.—The idea of the French Ambassador in London and of the Ministry here is that as yet it is not absolutely certain what are the real designs of the cabinet of St. James—they say that if the vessels seized and the disputed navigation of those coasts are the real and sole causes of the armament there is no doubt that there will be peace—that is to say that will be induced to negotiate and make the necessary sacrifices add, that if the wishes of England are to profit

of the present situation of Europe in order to undertake an advantageous war (and which they seem to apprehend) they have no doubt they will find some other pretext to which no negociation can be opposed. I have very sufficient proofs that these are the sentiments of ministry here and that they are not yet fixed in their opinions as to the real object of the preparations going on in England.

You will without doubt have seen before you receive this letter the memorial of one of the owners of the vessels seized in Nootka sound. It appears by it that there were two American vessels there at the same time which were unmolested by the Spanish commander, and which even seem to have been employed in a part of the operation. The English Minister at this court considers the American vessels as having been forced to this against their will. I do not know what is the opinion of his court on this subject. It would seem natural that it should be the same.

No change has as yet taken place in the ministry here—that which I mentioned to you in a former letter as being very probable was first postponed for particular reasons and is at present not thought of. a change of circumstances may perhaps bring on again a plan which was then near its execution.

It is believed that the Emperor of Morocco is dead—it was reported some time ago when it was not true. At present however there seems no doubt, although my last letters from Mr. Carmichael do not mention it. It is probable his successor will not be very scrupulous as to the treaties existing. I do not venture to use the cypher which Mr. Jefferson left with me, as my experience of that for Mr. Carmichael shews me there is some mistake, and makes me fear it may be the same as to yours.—I am still ignorant of the arrangements which may have taken place in the department of foreign affairs, and therefore consider myself as authorized to continue addressing you my letters—I hope you will allow me to add to them assurances of the respect and attachment with which I have the honor to be Sir,

Your most obedient servant.

W[ILLIAM] SHORT.

IV. William Short to John Jay.

(Despatches, France, Volume 1, Despatch No. 36.)

Paris July the 7th. 1790.

Dear Sir—

I have just received your letter of the 27th of May, which has been sent here from L'Orient by M. de Crevecœur. My last letters will have informed you of the present situation of the business relative to the American captives at Algiers. You will have seen there that nothing has been done, or possible to be done, for their redemption. This I know will not surprize you when you recollect the circumstances attending it. Still I shall leave nothing untried and will write you regularly as you desire respecting it.—Some days ago a person who has resided many years at Algiers, called on me in company with M. Volney whom you know, to speak of a means of procuring peace with that Regency on advantageous terms. It was for Congress to equip some frigates themselves, or to authorize a company to do it, and to cruise in the Mediterranean, particularly on the coast of Egypt against the Turkish merchant vessels—He said it was unquestionable that the Porte could force Algiers to conclude a treaty with any power whatever—that finding their commerce harassed, the Turks would gladly exchange their interposition at Algiers for its security—and that thus the United States who would be sure of failing so long as they should address the Algerines by embassies or entreaties, would be as sure of succeeding whenever they should speak to the fears and interest of the Turks.—this is the leading idea of his plan, which he seems to have considered under all its circumstances. He went into several details respecting it, which he is to communicate to me in writing. He has reasons for not chusing to be named; but wishes his ideas to be communicated to Congress. His calculation is that three frigates manned by two hundred men each would suffice. He does not propose their cruising off Algiers because a greater number would then be necessary —because a much longer time would be requisite for making an impression on the Algerines by this means; and consequently the success much less certain. He proposes cruising against the Turkish merchantmen because the prizes would much more than indemnify for the expences of equipment and because it is much the most expeditious and certain mode of effecting the business at Algiers. His favorite idea is that the affair should be mercantile—viz. that all the expences should be furnished by individuals on the condition of their having all the profits, and he desires to be interested in the enterprize by placing a part of his fortune in it. He wishes that Congress should give the letters of marque for reasons that are obvious. There are several objections which occur at first view, to this plan: still as it may lead to

something towards the business with Algiers I thought it my duty to communicate it. This person's long residence at Constantinople and at Algiers gives him an opportunity of being fully acquainted with the relations which subsist between those two countries. He says there are several instances where the Regency has not complied with the requisitions of the Porte; but that they are cases where the Porte makes requisitions for form sake, and where a private agreement takes place for exempting the Regency from obedience—He affirms that the Regency never disobeys the decided will of the Porte—It is from thence he concludes that the United States should make use of the Porte in order to effect their peace. The Turkish interest being more exposed to the attacks of the United States than that of Algiers, is an additional motive, as it is interest alone which will weigh with them.

It has been said in the national assembly lately that the last peace with Algiers cost France 1400,000 l. instead of 800,000 l. as I mentioned in a former letter. I have been since assured that the additional 600,000 l. were occasioned by the after charges and unexpected exactions of the Regency. You will remember they did the same with respect to Spain. It is apprehended that some unauthorized violence lately offered by the inhabitants of the French coast of the Mediterranean to a number of Algerines, will force France to renew the humiliation and expences of another treaty.

You express a wish that I should be able to obtain the free introduction of our salted provisions into France.—My letters will have shewn that I have not lost sight of this important subject.—and in my No. 33. I inclosed you a letter which Mr. Lambert the Comptroller general had written me relative to it. Mr. Necker has since told me he would give orders for a contract for a small supply merely as an experiment. He wished me to recommend some American merchant for this purpose. I knew of none except Parker who is in London, and I have written to him on the subject, but do not know whether he will give himself the trouble for a small contract. Mr. Necker doubts much whether the people of Paris will be brought to make use of salted provisions at any price however moderate, for some time to come. The only duties to which salted provisions from America are subjected as you will have seen by Mr. Lambert's letter, are those which are paid on French provisions passing from one part of France to another. I have no doubt that even those duties will be taken off as soon as the new regulations of commerce take place—At present however the ministry cannot take it on themselves, and in fact do nothing of the kind. It shall however be fully attended to; and the exception as to tonnage not forgotten, as soon as I shall know that it has passed.

I communicated to Mr. Necker the Resolve which you inclosed me in a former letter. He received with pleasure that proof of the attention of Congress to their foreign engagements. He is very anxious to know their decision relative to the loan lately made at Amsterdam. I still think as formerly that a person properly authorized by Congress might make that loan the basis of others so as to effect on advantageous and sure terms such as they will judge proper probably to have made for the discharge of their debts due this country, and which it is so essential to attend to without delay, from a variety of considerations.

The subject of the Duke of Orleans's return was brought before the assembly yesterday by a letter which he wrote to his Chancellor to be communicated to them. He said that he was preparing to leave London when the Ambassador of France called on him with an aide de camp of M. de la fayette, who told him that the general conjured him not to return to Paris. He wished the national assembly to be consulted and added that if they declared *qu'il n'y avoit point lieu à délibérer,* he should consider it as a permission to return. M. de la fayette in answer to this letter observed to the assembly that he had informed the Duke of Orleans that the reasons for his absenting himself still continued. He took that oppo. however of assuring the assembly that the more the 14th. approached the less grounds he saw for the alarms which were circulated as to the event of that day.

The assembly proceeded to the order of the day without taking the letter into consideration, but at the same time avoiding the expression qu'il n'y avoit pas lieu à délibérer.—It is therefore still uncertain whether the Duke will return. The King has written to him also to engage him to defer it for the present.—In the mean time he has published what he calls an '*exposé de sa conduite dans la révolution de France.*'—this was probably intended as his precursor. it is a narrative of facts known to every body—and neither proves or disproves any thing.

The deputies are arriving from all parts of France for the 14th. besides those who are deputed a great number of others come as spectators—it began to be feared that the works of the Champ de Mars would not be finished in time—some volunteers went to assist the workmen employed—this spread like a flame through Paris and people of both sexes and all ranks and descriptions flock there to work—this carries others as spectators so that the Champ de Mars is every day so crowded as scarcely to leave room for the carting of the earth and other operations of the sort which are going on there. Many legs and arms have already been broken in the confusion—these crowds going

and returning give the streets of Paris the appearance they had last year as to numbers—but very different as to humour—as yet they are all gaiety. Still it is impossible to say what impulsion they may take, if they are to be acted on as is suspected by foreign gold.—The enthusiasm has extended beyond the limits of Paris. at this instant large numbers of peasantry from the neighbouring villages are formed in a line of march which extends from the new grille to a considerable distance beyond M. de Richelieu's, and are going to work at the Champ de Mars.

The committee of constitution are preparing a decree by the direction of the assembly, in order to explain that of the 19th. They propose to allow every person to retain the name he is accustomed to—the titles however to be abolished, i. e.—all public acts where they are used to be void.—some other alterations also will be made as to the article concerning liveries and coats of arms. One of the members of the assembly, the Baron de Menou, proposed some time ago that all orders should be abolished, such as *cordons bleus*—rouge etc.—the order of the day however was brought on without the motion being then taken up. Still one of the leading members of the committee of constitution is for rendering it a constitutional decree—should it be proposed by that committee, which however is not certain, it will unquestionably pass.

Some time ago one of the members of the assembly was arrested by the orders of a municipality on suspicion of trying to debauch a regiment.—the question of inviolability being taken up on account of this affair, it was decreed that it extended even to criminal cases—that is, that no member should be arrested unless the accusation were previously laid before the assembly, who should decide whether there were grounds for arrest.—to-day a creditor of one of their members has written to them that he has obtained judgment, and desired to know if he was authorized to proceed to arrest him—it was decided that he could—thus the inviolability of the members is for criminal and not for civil cases.—these contradictions must necessarily arise so long as the assembly proceed as at present in passing laws on a single reading.

A letter has just arrived here from Bilbao written by a well known merchant, which says the Spanish Ministry had sent to inform them there that an arrangement had taken place with England—in consequence of which all vessels might follow their destination with safety. M. Bourgoin[g] tells me that he knows the writer of the letter and is persuaded of its veracity. He has no doubt that arrangements are made for continuing the peace between Spain and England. He remains however, and so does M. Montmorin, astonished that the first intelligence should come by a private and circuitous chañel. there is no

doubt that the terms of accomodation must be disadvantageous to Spain. More certain intelligence is hourly expected. The last accounts of the British fleet are that it was still at Torbay—their destination therefore still as uncertain as when they left port.—You will no doubt have learned that several American sailors were impressed in London, and that they were rescued by the zealous exertions and activity of Mr. Cutting. Since then one other has been impressed whom Mr. Cutting has been unable to get released. He is on board of the fleet and will probably be forced to serve so long as they have any occasion for him. You will certainly have received from Mr. Cutting the particulars of this affair which seems to deserve the earliest attention of Congress, and points out the necessity of some arrangement being made for preventing such cases in future.

I omitted mentioning above that the number of our prisoners at Algiers is now reduced to fourteen—a Scotch boy who was among them having been redeemed by the intervention of the English Consul—the price was somewhat more than 7000 l. but additional and unavoidable expences raised it on the whole to about 8000 l. The person of whom I spoke in the beginning of this letter, told me that he thought the remaining captives might be redeemed at the same price for the common sailors and about 12,000 l. for each of the Captains. He added that the Spanish Consul was at present in the greatest favor with the Regency, and would be the most proper person for being charged with such a commission. The same person told me that he had understood the present Emperor of Morocco had begun his reign by shewing dispositions to observe the treaties made by his predecessor. He thought it probable that ours would be continued. In general however I have understood that we should be obliged to renew it. this is the opinion also of Carmichael, from whom you will certainly first learn the result.—I mention to you in the case of his letters being longer on their way, that he has received your dispatches of the 11th. of April, and been presented in consequence of the new letter of credence.

I beg you to be assured of the sentiments of respect and attachment with which I am,

Dear Sir

Your most obedient humble servant

W[ILLIAM] SHORT.

P. S. The Leyden gazettes will be inclosed in this letter—The journals of the assembly and other papers shall be forwarded to Havre by the diligence to be sent by the first vessel sailing for New-York.

V. JOHN JAY TO EDMUND RANDOLPH.

(Despatches, England, Volume 1.)

private LONDON 13 Septr. 1794

Sir

I have had the pleasure of receiving your Letter by Mr Fisher. He called when I was from Home. Then and directly afterwards, I was so engaged in public Business, as that I could not return his visit immediately. The moment I could find Liesure for the purpose, I called with Col. Trumbull at his Lodgings; and was mortified to learn that he had just gone to Liverpool. I hope on his Return to see him, and then to have an opportunity of shewing him those Civilities and attentions which I shall always think due to your Recommendations.

In my *public* Letter to you by this opportunity, I thought it most delicate to omit mentioning that your Letter by Mr. Munro, and his Speech to the Convention are regarded here as not being consistant with the neutral situation of the U. S. an uneasy sensation has thereby been made here in the public mind, and probably in that of the Cabinet. It is not pleasant for me to say these things, but so is the fact, and it is proper that you should know it.

I enclose two pamphlets. How far the Ideas they convey may be useful in our Country I cannot say.

With the best Wishes for your Health and Happiness

I am Sir your most obt. Hble servt.

JOHN JAY.

The Honl. Edm. Randolph Esqr.

VI. JOHN Q. ADAMS TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE [JOHN MARSHALL].

(Despatches, Germany, Special Volume, Despatch No. 182.)

BERLIN 21 February 1801.

Sir

In addition to the papers, which I had the honour of sending you with my last letter, I now enclose a translation of the ordinance annexed to the Convention for an armed neutrality, and referred to in its third Article.

It is yet possible that England may discover some means of avoiding the issue of a War with almost all Europe, on this occasion; but I know not by what other expedient than that of conforming herself to the principles prescribed by the Northern powers.

But if she should persist in her refusal to recognize them, a war will inevitably be the consequence, and as there is some reason to apprehend that endeavours will be made on the part of the coalition to draw the United States into it, I take the liberty of stating to you as briefly as possible the considerations upon which it appears to me that it would be neither just nor expedient for us to take any part in this quarrel.

It would not be just, because the Government of the United States, have long since declared their opinion that by the law of Nations, independent of the stipulations of Treaties, an enemy's cargo cannot be protected by a neutral bottom; and though always desirous to establish the contrary by voluntary agreement, they have ever disavow'd all pretence of a right to force its adoption upon other powers; and by the positive engagement of a Treaty are bound to acquiesce in the practice of the rule as it originally stood. It is true that Sweden and Denmark are expressly bound by the stipulations of their Treaties with England, in the same manner, nor do I know upon what grounds those powers can reconcile their antient with their modern stipulations. But even if the question was considered as doubtful; the fundamental principle of this league seems unjust; it has itself the radical defect against which it professes to contend. It assumes a right of legislation upon the sea. It is an enactment ex parte, by two nations, of laws upon objects of common concern to all, with a declaration that if other nations will not submit to them peaceably they shall be forced upon them at the mouth of the cannon. It is impossible to assume the supremacy of the seas more plainly and arrogantly than this. The inconsistency of the league with the liberty which it professes to support, is striking in the very expression of the third article—The two sovereigns say, that to prevent the liberty of trade and navigation, and neutral rights from depending upon *arbitrary construction,* dictated by a partial and momentary interest, they *understand and will* (what else is that but arbitrary construction?) that in time of war, all neutral ships, shall neutralize all the property on board except a specific list of contraband.—It is well known that this idea of being the legislatrix of the ocean, and giving the world a code of naval laws was the lure of flattery by which the empress Catherine was first drawn into the original armed neutrality, the nature and tendency of which she so little understood, that she thought it pointed against Spain, and much to the advantage of England.

In expressing thus unequivocally my opinion that this league is not founded upon a basis of justice, I beg not to be understood as approving the practices towards neutrals of the british navy, or all the

principles avowed by the british admiralty courts. There is too much reason for the complaints of neutral powers against these, and I should consider a *real* armed neutrality, a concert of neutral powers to maintain if necessary by force their common rights against violation, as perfectly justifiable, as a desirable object. Had this new league even been such as the newspapers in Holland and Germany have represented it—had it left the litigious belligerent and neutral claims respecting the character of a ship and her cargo, to be stipulated *by Treaty,* engaging at the same time to conclude no Treaty for the future with any power which should refuse to recognize the predominance of the neutral right, no objection of injustice could have been made against it. I have often avowed the hope that some such concert might take place; but there appears less chance for it now than ever.

To those who think that any measure on the part of a nation can be expedient, which is at the same time unjust, it may be much more questionable what the conduct of the United States on this occasion should be. While Britain is at War with all Europe, it is probable to say the least that she will sink under the contest. To join in the number of her enemies may be considered as advisable to avoid their resentment, and to share in her spoils. By joining them we should make the common triumph more certain, and we should establish forever the most liberal principles for the benefit of neutral navigation. We should obtain satisfaction for the long complaints of our commerce, and security against the repetition of such abuses for the future. Some* of these motives, perhaps no one would avow, yet if the consideration of justice is to be set aside they are the strongest that can be urged. But the triumph of the coalition, even if we should join it is very far from being certain—Should it be obtained, it would only be after a struggle in which all the powers concerned in the league who have any considerable interest in the principles of maritime law, would have sacrificed more of blood and treasure than centuries of undisturbed enjoyment of their principles could repair. England has the advantage of standing alone, and of having her forces applied by a single interest; of contending upon her own element, and in a defensive cause. Her enemies are divided in interests—The only two formidable powers of the league, entered it for the purpose of securing objects entirely distinct from the rights of navigation—Should they succeed in obtaining their real purposes they will very soon abandon the pretexts; when once they

*From here the writing is done with a different pen, and apparently on a different day, after Adams had had time to think over the conclusions he had already set forth.

have secured their own interests they will drop one by one from the league, and leave their feeble allies to be the victims of the contest. Should they fail, they will be still readier to forsake an unsuccessful cause—The experience of the last ten years has abundantly proved that success and defeat are alike efficacious in dissolving enormous coalitions against a single great power. Thus probable as it may be that England will be ruined by this War, the probability is much greater that the inferior maritime states leagued against her will meet the same fate. As a mere question of choice between two evils, if we must choose between the resentments of the whole coalition and a War with England, we should probably receive the greatest damage from the last—I am likewise convinced that a fix'd resolution to persevere through this new contest in that neutrality which was established as our true system of policy at the commencement of the maritime War, will carry us through all the inconveniences, embarassments and vexations to which the coolness or even the resentment of the coalition may subject us.

To the Government of the United States, I am persuaded that the last of these considerations will be unnecessary—They will enquire only what conduct the national honour and dignity, the laws of nations and the engagements of Treaties dictate, and to these they will faithfully adhere. But to ensure the respect of both parties, this system must be supported by a respectable naval force; and a force which in case of War would be scarcely better than none at all, will amply suffice for the support of neutrality.

I am most respectfully, Sir, your very humble and obedt. Servt.

JOHN Q. ADAMS.

P. S—The reports of Peace between France and Austria noticed in all my late letters were erroneous. It is now given out for certain that the peace was signed on the 9th: It is both with the Emperor and the Empire. So I am informed, though this is not so certain, as that it is burdensome, as might be expected, to the house of Austria.

The Secretary of State

VII. JOHN QUINCY ADAMS TO JAMES MONROE.

(Despatches, Russia, Volume 2, Despatch No. 105.)

The Secretary of State of the United States

ST. PETERSBURG 2 February 1813.

Sir

I have continued in the Extracts from the Gazettes to give you the substance of all the official Bulletins published here relating to the military op ›f ır between Russia and France. The

Catastrophe of the French armies has been more complete than the imagination of the most sanguine of their Enemies ever anticipated, and as terrible as the most inveterate could have desired. Their losses by the most moderate computations exceed three hundred thousand men.

The Emperor Napoleon personally succeeded in making his escape, and travelling with equal secrecy and rapidity, without guards, without attendants, accompanied only by the Duke of Vicence, and passing under his name reached Paris late at Night on the 18th. Decr. The next day he received upon his Throne addresses from the Senate and Council of State, addresses which together with his answers to them have been published. During his absence, and while he was yet in the Career of victory, a formidable conspiracy against his Government had been defeated only by a premature attempt to accomplish its object. When the disasters of his armies had become too great to admit of concealment, they were partially acknowledged in a Bulletin which was published just before his arrival at Paris, and which produced symptoms of popular fermentation threatening the stability of his authority. The project of restoring the throne of France to the House of Bourbon is again strenuously urged in the English Ministerial papers; that of reducing France to its antient limits as when governed by the Bourbons, though less distinctly avowed, is inseperably connected with it. They are both naturally favoured here, and certainly at no period since the commencement of the French Revolution have the Circumstances of the times given greater appearance of plausibility to the design.

The War in its progress has been extremely destructive and distressing to Russia, but its result has been not only to deliver her entirely from that terror of the French Power, which had spread itself so universally over the whole Continent of Europe, but to place in the hands of Russia herself that predominant influence which France had been so long and so perseveringly striving to establish. It is scarcely possible but that henceforth Russia should be the arbitress of Europe *by Land.* Her loss of Human lives in this dreadful struggle has probably been greater than that of France. Her loss of property has certainly been more considerable. But her losses have not been in the sinews of her strength. Those of France have been in the vitals of her military power. The spell of the Emperor Napoleon's name is not yet totally dissolved. His friends yet cherish a vague and general hope, and his Enemies feel an involuntary fear that his transcendant *Genius* (so they term it) will yet burst forth, chain down Fortune at his feet, and range the world again, conquering and to conquer. I see no substantial ground for such a hope or such a fear. The highest proba-

bilities now are that his fall will be as great as his elevation has been extraordinary, and with regard to his Genius, if it ever surpassed that of other great Generals and Statesmen, it has most assuredly deserted him in the undertaking, and in the execution of the Russian War. That it was lightly, wantonly—unjustly undertaken I have the most thorough conviction from an attentive and impartial observation of its rise and progress, of which my communications from this place to your Department during that whole period contain the result. That in its execution the most flagrant and egregious blunders or imprudences, continually insulted the indulgence of Fortune, and produced his final overthrow, is equally clear and far more notorious. The Genius, that suffer'd the most inveterate of Russia's Enemy's, the Ottoman Porte, to conclude a disadvantageous Peace with her at the very moment when he was invading Poland, released Admiral Tchichagoff's army to force his right wing and close upon his rear on one side. The Genius that drove Sweden, under one of his own Generals, into the arms of Russia, released another army from Inraborg* and the Finland frontier, with which Wittgenstein forced his left Wing at Polotsk, and closed upon his rear on the other side. The Genius which rushed headlong on to Moscow in September without foreseeing or preparing for the possible necessity of retreat, in Winter, and the Genius, which found ice and frost *premature,* in November, under Polish and Russian skies, is not that sort of Genius which by the steadiness of its judgment, and the immensity of its resources redeems from such overwhelming ruin as that in which he by such errors as these involved his whole Army. That he may still maintain his authority in France it would be presumptous to deny. That he may again collect armies and win battles is altogether possible, and by errors not unlike his own may be rendered hereafter even probable. But in the general tenour of human history, when Fortune has once turned her back upon those to whom she has been most lavish of her favours, she never takes them to her arms again. A Cast off favourite must look for any thing but kindness.

In the annihilation of that immense host, which but half a year since, burst upon the Russian Empire, Providence has certainly reserved the greatest and mo[illegible]al agency to itself. But in the conduct of the Sovereign, of [illegible]Citizens, of the Peasantry and of the Army of this [illegible]y trial which they have been called to endure, it [illegible]injustice to deny that there has been litt[illegible]en [illegible]d and admire. The

*So in the c[illegible]obably meant.

Spirit of Patriotism has burnt with the purest and most vivid flame in every class of the community. The exertions of the Nation have been almost unparralleld, the greatest sacrifices have been made cheerfully and spontaneously. I wrote you before the War began that it was anticipated with some dejection and despondency. But from the moment it began scarcely a symptom of that kind has ever betrayed itself among any class of the Russian People. In the most trying extremity they have been calm and collected; deeply anxious, but uniformly confident and sanguine in their hopes of the result.

On the 19th. of December the Emperor Alexander left this City and on the 22d. arrived at the Head Quarters of his Army at Willna.* He is still with them, and there is no present expectation of his return. The Chancellor Count Romanzoff has not yet followed him. A commercial Treaty with England is talked of among the Merchants, but is not even in discussion between the Governments.

I am with great respect
Sir,
Your very humble and obedt. Servt.
JOHN QUINCY ADAMS.

VIII. JOHN QUINCY ADAMS TO JAMES MONROE.

(Despatches, Russia, Volume 2, Despatch No. 139.)

The Secretary of State of the United States.

GHENT 5. September 1814

Sir.

On the 25th. ulto. we sent into the British Plenipotentiaries, our answer to their Note, and had every reason to expect that before this day the negotiations would have been terminated. Two days afterwards Mr Bayard was explicitly told in a conversation with Mr Goulburn that their reply would be sent to us without delay, and that they should have no occasion, previous to sending it, for any further reference to their Government. On Wednesday the 31st: Mr. Baker called upon Mr Gallatin, with an apology for a delay of a very few days, the British Plenipotentiaries, having concluded in consideration of the great importance of the thing, to send their Note to England, for the approbation of their Government before they transmitted it to us. The next morning I had a conversation with Mr Goulburn, which convinced me that the sole object of this reference was to give a greater appearance of deliberation and solemnity to the rupture.

Some of the particulars of this Conversation, render it in my mind sufficiently interesting for the substance of it to be reported to

*Vilna.

you. I began it by expressing some satisfaction at having learnt their reference to their Government; as it tended to encourage the hope that they would *reconsider* some part of their proposals to the United States. He did not think it probable—and in the whole tenor of his discourse I perceived not only a spirit of inflexible adherence to the terms which we have rejected, but under the cover of a personal deportment sufficiently courteous, a rancorous animosity against America, which disclosed that there was nothing like Peace at the heart.

The great argument to which he continually recurred, in support of the Indian Boundary, and the exclusive military possession of the Lakes by the British was the necessity of them for the security of Canada. The American Government, he said had manifested the intention and the determination of conquering Canada. "And, *excepting you* (said he) I believe it was the astonishment of the whole World, that Canada had not been conquered at the very outset of the War. Nothing could have saved it, but the excellent dispositions and military arrangements of the Governor who commanded there. We were then not prepared for an attack upon that Province with such an overwhelming force—But now, we have had time to send reinforcements, and I do not think you will conquer it. In order however to guard against the same thing in future it is necessary to make a barrier against the American settlements, upon which neither party shall be permitted to encroach. The Indians are but a secondary object. As the allies of Great Britain, she must include them in in the Peace, as in making Peace, with other Powers, she included Portugal, as her ally. But when the boundary is once defined it is immaterial whether the Indians are upon it or not. Let it be a desart. But we shall know that you cannot come upon us to attack us, without crossing it. The stipulation to maintain no armed force on the Lakes, is for the same purpose—the security of Canada. I can see nothing dishonourable or humiliating in it. The United States can never be in any danger of invasion from Canada. The disproportion of force is too great. But Canada must always be in the most imminent danger of invasion from the United-States, unless guarded by some such stipulations as are now demanded. It can be nothing to the United-States to agree not to arm upon the Lakes; since they never had actually done it before the present War. Why s[illegible]v object to disarming there, where they had never before ha[illegible] I answered that the Conquest of Canada had nev[illegible]: War, on the part of the United States. It has [illegible]onsequence of the War, as they themselves [illegible]he United-States. It was an

effect and not a Cause of the War. I thought with him that we should not *now* conquer it. But I had no doubt we should, and that at no very distant period, if any such terms as they now required should ever be submitted to, by us. The American Government I said, never had declared the intention of conquering Canada. He referred to General Hull's Proclamtion. I answered that the American Government was not responsible for that. It was no uncommon thing for commanding Officers to issue proclamations which were disavowed by their Government, of which a very recent example had occurr'd, in a Proclamation of Admiral Cochrane. He said that the American Government had not disavowed Hull's proclamation, and that the British Government had not disavowed any proclamation of Admiral Cochrane's. I replied that the American Government had never been called upon either to avow or disavow Hull's Proclamation, but I had seen in a printed Statement of the debates in the House of Commons, that Lord Castlereagh had been called upon to say whether Admiral Cochrane's Proclamation had been authorized or not, and had answered that it was not. He said that Lord Castlereagh had been asked whether a Proclamation of Admiral Cochrane's, *encouraging the negroes to revolt,* had been authorized by the government, and had answered in the negative; that is, that no Proclamation, encouraging the negroes to revolt had been authorized. But the Proclamation of Admiral Cochrane referred to, gave no such encouragement: there was not a word about negroes in it——It merely offered employment or a settlement in the British Colonies to such persons as might be disposed to leave the United-States—I asked him what was the import of the term *free,* used in the Proclamation, in connection with the offer of settlements? he answered the question with some hesitation, but admitted that it might be understood as having reference to slaves. I admitted on my part that the word "negroes," was not in the proclamation, but remarked that he must be as sensible, as I was, that it could have reference only to them. That certainly no person in America could mistake its meaning. It was unquestionably intended for the negroes, and corresponded sufficiently with the practice of others of their naval officers. It was known that some of them, under similar inducements, had taken away blacks, who had afterwards been sold in the West-India Islands—Upon this Mr: Goulburn, with an evident struggle to suppress a feeling of strong irritation said "*that* he could undertake to deny in the most unqualified terms—The character of British naval Officers, was universally known . . . their generosity and humanity could never be contested; and besides, that since the Act of Parliament of 1811. the act of selling any man for a

and temperate in the manner; though sometimes very earnest on mine, and sometimes with a hurry of reply and an embarrassment of expression, on his, indicating an effort to controul the disclosure of feelings under strong excitement. The most remarkable instance of this was upon the intimation from me, that some of their naval Officers had enticed away numbers of our black people, who had afterwards been sold in the West-India Islands.—I stated the fact on the authority of your Instructions to the present joint mission of 28 January last, and persisted in asserting it, on the assurance that there is proof of it, in possession of the Department of State. In the present state of public opinion in England, respecting the traffic in slaves, I was well aware of the impression which the mere statement would make upon Mr Goulburn——The rupture of this Negotiation will render it unnecessary for us to possess the proof, which it was your intention at the date of your instructions of 28 Jany: to furnish us, but at any future attempt to treat for Peace, it will be important to produce it, and I would even suggest the expediency of giving as much publicity as possible to it, in Europe, while the War continues.

The avowal of Admiral Cochrane's proclamation, and the explanation of Lord Castlereagh's disavowal of it in the house of commons, were remarkable as examples of the kind of reasoning to which the British Government is willing to resort. Whether the distinction taken in this case really belonged to Lord Castlereagh, or whether erroneously ascribed to him by Mr Goulburn, I cannot say.. But Mr Goulburn was present in the house of Commons, when the debate referred to took place.

The strongest feature in the general complexion of his discourse, was the inflexible adherence to the proposed Indian Boundary line. But the pretext upon which this proposition had in the first instance been placed, the pacification with the Indians, and their future security was almost abandoned—avowed to be a secondary and very subordinate object—The security of Canada was now substituted as the prominent motive. But the great and real one, though not of a nature ever to be acknowledged, was occasionally discernable through all its veils. This was no other than a profound and rankling Jealousy at the rapid increase of population and of settlements in the United States; an impotent longing to thwart their progress and to stunt their growth. With this temper prevailing in the British Councils, it is not in the hour of their success that we can expect to obtain a peace upon equal terms of equal justice or of reciprocity.

I am, with great Respect, Sir, your very humble and obedt: Servt.

JOHN QUINCY ADAMS.

P. S.—We have just received the reply to our Note.

IX. John Quincy Adams to James Monroe.

(Despatches, Russia, Volume 2, Despatch No. 140.)

The Secretary of State, of the United States.

Ghent 10 October 1814.

Sir.

Since the departure of Mr Dallas, with the dispatches of the joint mission, by the John Adams, our Conferences with the British Plenipotentiaries, have been suspended, and all our official intercourse with them has been in writing.

A copy of their first Note, dated 19. August, was forwarded by Mr: Dallas. On the 24th. of the same Month we answered that Note, rejecting in the most explicit terms the proposed definitive Indian Boundary, the cession of Territory to Great-Britain, and the demand of a stipulation on our part to dismantle the fortifications on our frontiers, and to maintain no naval force upon the Lakes.

On the 5th: of September we received their second Note, dated the 4th: It insisted on all the demands made in the first, but manifested a disposition to modify some parts of them, and to abandon others— We answered it on the 9th. They had given us the alternatives of continuing the Negotiation upon their exposition of their Views; of breaking it off; or of referring to our Government, for further Instructions— You will recollect however that in their first Note they had warned us, that if we should refer to our Government, they would not be bound to abide by their present offers, but would vary their demands according as the circumstances of the War might warrant—Our answer to their alternatives was that we desired to continue the Negotiation provided they would abandon the demands which we had already rejected.

Their third Note was dated on the 19th: of September, and received by us on the 20th: It abandoned the definitive Indian Boundary as a Sine qua non, but expressed an intention to propose a temporary Boundary, for discussion—It abandoned apparently the demand for the exclusive military occupation of the Lakes; but announced the purpose of making a proposal on this subject so liberal and generous that they thought it could not be refused. But they presented as a new Sine qua non that the Indian allies of Great-Britain should be included in the pacification.

Our answer was delivered to them on the 26th: of September. It proposed an Article, in the Nature of an Amnesty; that no persons, whether Citizens, Subjects, or Indians of either party, should be molested or annoyed, in person or property for any part taken by them in the War.

On Saturday Evening the 8th: instant, we received their fourth Note, enclosing a proposed Article as their ultimatum. It provides that on the Ratification of the Peace, all hostilities against the Indian Tribes or Nations engaged in the War shall cease on both sides; provided the Indians shall on their part cease from hostilities on the notification of the Peace to them. And that they shall be restored to all the rights, privileges and possessions as they held them in 1811 before the commencement of the War.

We do not send you copies of all these Papers by the present occasion, because we expect to dispatch a Messenger to you in a very few days, when we shall have prepared our answer to this last Note. Although I am not certain that the Negotiation will close at this stage, and although the British Government have abandoned so much and such objectionable parts of their Sine qua non, I see no reason for altering the opinion expressed to you at the close of our joint Letter of 19. August.

Mr Boyd arrived at Bordeaux on the 17th. at Paris on the 23d. and here on the 29th. ultimo. He is now at Amsterdam; we expect his return in the course of a few days. We have applied for a Passport for the return of the Transit.

We received the duplicates of your dispatches of 25 and 27. June, from the British Plenipotentiaries. But your Letter of 9 July was not with them.

I am with perfect respect, Sir, your very humble and obedt: Servt.

JOHN QUINCY ADAMS.

X. JOHN QUINCY ADAMS TO JAMES MONROE.

(Despatches, Russia, Volume 2, Despatch No. 143.)

The Secretary of State of the United States.

GHENT 20. November 1814.

Sir.

The Chauncey sailed on the first of this Month from Ostend, and by her we transmitted to you, copies of all the official papers which had passed between the British Plenipotentiaries and us. The interval that had elapsed since the departure of the John Adams was so long, that I am apprehensive you may have thought it unnecessarily protracted. It was owing to the reluctance with which the Supercargo of the Chauncey came to the determination of proceeding to America; and to the dilatory proceedings of the British Admiralty, upon our applications for Passports for Vessels, to convey our dispatches. On the 7th: of September we had by a Note to the British Plenipotentiaries,

requested them to obtain such a Passport for the Schooner Herald, lying at Amsterdam. There were a number of persons, Citizens of the United States, who were desirous of returning in that vessel as Passengers, and we gave their names, with the intimation of a wish that they might be inserted, as Passengers on the Passport—We have not to this day received any answer from the Admiralty, upon this application.

When Mr Boyd arrived here, we immediately addressed a Note to the Plenipotentiaries, asking a Passport for the Transit to return to the United States with our dispatches. At the same time we informed them that you had been obliged to dispatch her without any Passport, and sent them copies of your note to Lord Castlereagh, enclosing the duplicates of your Letters of 25 and 27 June to us, and of Admiral Cockburn's Letter to you, alleging his Commander's orders for refusing a Passport for a vessel in July, because he judged it sufficient to have given one for another vessel the preceding March—and we intimated to them that their officers had thus to the utmost extent of their power precluded our Government from transmitting to us any Instructions subsequent to their knowledge of the important changes in the affairs of Europe, which had so essential a bearing upon the objects of our Negotiation. The Circumstance was the more remarkable, because the British Plenipotentiaries had in one of their Notes made it a subject of reproach to the Government of the United States, that they had not furnished us with Instructions after being informed of the pacification of Europe. We had indeed told them at the Conference of the 9th: of August that we had then received Instructions dated at the close of June. But this had altogether escaped their recollection; so that while Admiral Cockburn was writing you that his superior Officer had decided that there was no further occasion for our Government to instruct us, until they should receive dispatches from us, the British Government was taking it for granted that we had received no Instructions, and was charging it as an indication that the American Government was not sincerely disposed to Peace.

It was nearly five weeks after we made this Communication, asking a Passport for the Transit, when we received it. The Passport requires that she should go in Ballast, and with no other Passenger than a bearer of dispatches from us. No answer has been given us, either in relation to Admiral Cockburn's Letter to you, refusing a Cartel, or to your Note to Lord Castlereagh, enclosing the duplicates. We received the Passport for the Transit only the day before the Chauncey sailed, so that the length of time, between the dispatching of Mr Dallas and that of Mr Connell, and of course the long period which you will probably

be without direct advices from us, will have been owing to obstacles independent of our controul.

From the nature of the British pretensions and demands as disclosed in the first Note from their Plenipotentiaries to us, and from the tone with which they were brought forward, both in that Note, and in the Conference of the day on which it is dated, we had concluded that the rupture of the Negotiation would immediately ensue, and expected to have been discharged from our attendance at this place, before the first of September. The British Plenipotentiaries after receiving our answer to their first Note appeared to entertain the same expectation, and if the sincerity of their conversation can be implicitly trusted, they were not altogether in the secret of their own Government. It soon became apparent from the course pursued by them, that the intention of the British Cabinet was, neither to break off the Negotiation, nor to conclude the Peace. They expected that a powerful impression would be made in America by the armaments naval and military which they had sent and were continuing to send. At the same time the result of the Congress at Vienna was a subject of some uncertainty. The expediency of another campaign in America might depend upon its issue. Success in either hemisphere would warrant them in raising their demands at their own discretion. Failure on either or even on both sides would still leave them with a certainty of a Peace as favourable as they could have any reasonable pretence to require. They have accordingly confined their plenipotentiaries to the task of wasting time. After spending more than two Months upon a preliminary Article, which ultimately bore scarcely a feature of its original aspect, they twice successively evaded our request for an interchange of the project of a Treaty.—They have at last started it as a point of Etiquette, and appear to consider it as an advantage to receive the first draft instead of giving it. We have now endeavoured to gratify them in both respects. We have sent them our Project, and are now waiting for their's. In the mean time, Lord Liverpool has avowed in the debates on the Regent's Speech that their demands and proposals are to be regulated by circumstances, which implies that they are not yet prepared to conclude. One of the latest ministerial papers announces that the negotiation is not to succeed and that their Plenipotentiaries are very shortly to return to England. Of the latter part of this information I much doubt, for although the progress of the Negotiations at Vienna, daily strengthens the expectation that it will end without any immediate disturbance of the Peace of Europe, it does not yet promise a state of permanent tranquillity, which would make the policy of continuing at all Events the War with America, unquestionable.

I have received, and shall forward by the Transit, a packet of dispatches for you, from Mr Harris at St: Petersburg. It doubtless contains copies of the Note which he addressed to the Imperial department of foreign affairs, in relation to Admiral Cochrane's Proclamation of blockade of 25. April last. I know not whether it is to be regretted that Mr: Haris's Note was not presented until after the Emperor's departure for Vienna. He writes me that Mr: Weydemeyer at his suggestion had written to Count Nesselrode, requesting him to communicate directly to me the Emperor's answer on the subject of the Note—But I have not heard from the Count.

The popular sentiment throughout Europe has been and still is that the United States must sink in the present struggle against the whole power of Great-Britain. And such is the British ascendancy over all the Governments of Europe that even where the feelings of the People incline to favour us, they dare not yet unequivocally express them. The late Events in America, as far as they are known, have tended to produce some change in this respect. The destruction of the public buildings at Washington has been publicly reprobated in some of the French Gazettes, but it has been defended in others. Its general effect upon the public opinion has been unfavourable to the English; but the impression of their defeat at Baltimore, and especially of the retreat from Plattsburg has been much deeper. We shall have no valuable friends in Europe, until we have proved that we can defend ourselves without them. There will be friends enough, if we can maintain our own cause by our resources.

We have also received by two several occasions Letters to us, and dispatches for you, from Mr Sumter at Rio de Janeiro. They were sent by the Portugese Minister who attends the Congress at Vienna, and by Count Pahlen who is returning to Russia. Mr Sumter's dispatches for you, were left open for our perusal, and we shall forward them by the Transit.

I am, with great respect, Sir, your very humble and obedt Servt

JOHN QUINCY ADAMS.

XI. JONATHAN RUSSELL TO ROBERT SMITH.

(Despatches, France, Volume 12.)

PARIS 4th Decem 1810

Sir

I have already written you several letters by this opportunity but as the Commodore Rogers will have to wait on account of the westerly winds for the next spring tides I shall I trust be able to get this letter on board of her.

The efficient motive of the Government here for placing this ship at my disposal was to procure a safe conveyance for their new minister who takes passage in her for the United States.

Altho' Mr. Serurier professes to be well disposed towards the United States and probably is really so—yet he is devoted to the service of his master and this devotion will form the rule for his conduct. Indeed the strange influence, which the Emperor exercises over those whom he employs, appears to merge all they may possess of suavity or benevolence in a zeal to execute his unbending will. He has no favorite or confident—he neither loves or trusts those whom he finds it necessary to use but considering himself alone and concentrating within himself all his affections and all his projects he braves and he despises the opinions of others. His Ministers and his Marshals approach him—not to give their counsel but to receive his orders. The most intrepid among them shrink from his regard and a word from him confounds alike their wisdom and their courage. He has no policy but his power—and to make this power felt and feared he is obliged often to display it in acts of oppression and injustice. Whatever the Minister of Exterior, who is the only channel of communication for foreign nations, submits to him must remain till he chooses to take it into consideration and to give it an answer. If it be forgotten among the multiplicity of other concerns it is dangerous to recal it to his attention—for if thus recalled it is at the hazard of his displeasure and his injustice. I doubt not that many representations have passed *sub silencio* merely because the minister has feared to remind him of their existence. Indeed the awe which all about him manifestly feel is inconceivable to those who are not familiar with the excesses and extravagancies of a man possessed of absolute power and actuated by violent and unmanagable passions. Our relations with a country governed in this way must, I fear, at best be precarious and uncertain. For I humbly apprehend that our confidence in a foreign government ought not to be measured solely by its professions—or by the inaction or revocation of a few decrees but chiefly by the organization of that Government and the character of those who exercise its powers. And what security can we have for the permanency of any arrangement which depends on the single will of a spoilt child of fortune who regards neither the sanctity of principle or the decency of forms.

No one here except the Emperor knows if the Berlin and Milan decrees be absolutely revoked or not and no one dares enquire of him concerning them. The general opinion of those with whom I have conversed on the subject is that they are so revoked. There are indeed

among those who entertain this opinion several counsellors of state—but this is of little importance as the construction which the Emperor may choose to adopt will alone prevail and the most hardy of his statesmen will not presume to consider it to be incorrect.

The New Orleans packet lately arrived at Bordeaux is still under quarantine as a contagious disease is said to prevail at Gibralter the port from which she came. I still believe that her case will be so managed as to procrastinate a decision until it be known whether the condition presented to the United States has been performed or not. The general course of proceedure and which I presume will be pursued with regard to her is a temporary sequester while the papers can be transmitted to Paris to be examined and decided on by the council of commerce here. As this is now the ordinary practice it may satisfactorily explain why notice of the revocation of the decrees has not been given to the custom-houses—as a knowledge of this fact could be of no importance to those who are not qualified to act upon it.

I have seen the condemnation of the Whampoa which was pronounced on the 7th of November by the Council of prizes under the Milan decree. The Whampoa had long been in the ports of Holland and her trial was pending for months before the first of November—yet as that decree was *to cease to operate* after that period and no reservation was made for pronouncing confiscation altho' previously incurred—we have a right perhaps to consider its revocation to be *entire* and that not a single fragment of it survived on which to found an act either of seizure or confiscation. I have however forborne to make any representation to this government on the subject because I considered it to be indiscreet at this moment when the revocation itself was not well assured to enter into a controversy about its extent. When we have sufficient proof of the existence of the principal object we can, should policy require it, contend with safety for the mere incidents which belong to it.

Altho' from a great variety of circumstances I am induced to beleive that the continental system is not viewed by the Government here exactly as it was on the 5th of August last yet I also believe that should the proclamation of the President under the law of the first of May be issued—and received here—within a reasonable time—the Berlin and Milan decrees will not again be executed. As however this system appears now to be relied on as an efficient instrument for the destruction of British power—and as these decrees formed so essential a part of it—it is to be apprehended that their reluctant repeal will be followed by measures of equal violence to replace them. All that we can hope

for is that these measures may be so modified as not to violate our rights however unfavourable they may be to our interests.

British power is regarded as the offspring of British commerce and the attempt to destroy the former by the destruction of the latter will not be abandonned from a repugnance to involve the trade of neutral nations in the ruin. That this terrible system has progressively excluded from almost every part of the continent the flag of Britain and has pursued—and seized—and confiscated and burnt her merchandize and her manufactures not merely in the magazines at the seaports but in the inland hovels of Germany and the cottages of the Alps and thereby produced commercial distress and embarrassment at London cannot be denied—nor can it be denied that from the same causes the stocks in England have fallen and that the course of exchange from every part of the continent continues to be against her. But while France triumphantly boasts the effect of her system on her adversary she attempts to conceal or affects to disbeleive its effect upon herself. If the foreign commerce of England be diminished her own and that of her allies is absolutely annihilated. If the house of Goldsmith was deranged at London—the house of Simon at Paris and the house of Schmitz of Amsterdam—both equally eminent—are bankrupt. Nor have the French funds risen—on the contrary in spite of all the victories and all the plunder with which they are supported they continue to decline. The rate of exchange too is affected as well by the want of confidence and want of money on the continent as by the balance of trade between the continent and England. If indeed the former export more than she receives this relative state of trade proves nothing for the fact is that her positive amount of exports, if Russia be excepted, has dwindled almost to nothing and the industry which furnished it is perishing. Even this course of exchange so vaunted as the evidence of continental prosperity adds in fact to continental distress for it is at the loss of the drawer and discourages exportation.

While however I believe that the continental system produces much more misery to the continent than to England I also believe that it will not be abandonned until the maritime system of the latter—a system founded on the same principles of pride—violence and injustice be renounced. France from the habits of her people and the character of her government is, notwithstanding her sufferings, pre-eminently qualified for perseverance in this conflict of commercial privation. Commerce with her being at best but a secondary branch of industry may be suspended without essentially affecting the strength or the resources of the nation—and there is a power—whatever distress this

suspension might produce—to stifle every groan and arrest every convulsion. On the other hand the commerce of England is the soul which animates her—it is her nerve and sinew—her sensibility and her strength and should it perish her national existence must perish with it—Nor will the temper of her people long brook experiments which endanger it and of which they feel the evils without regarding the policy and the most sturdy of her ministers will find themselves obliged to respect this temper. It is from this view of the subject that I am induced to believe that France will not be the first to recede from the system—and no motive can have less influence with her than a regard for our rights. She may indeed admit occasional modifications in order to procure the conveniences of our intercourse. But on these we can place no reliance—they form no part of her permanent plan and probably will not be permitted to survive the wants which produce them.

For instance—the price of wheat in France has doubled within a few months past. This is owing to a scarcity of that article occasioned partly by an indifferent harvest and partly by the great demand for the armies in Spain. So entirely from the latter cause has Languedoc been drained that many of its inhabitants send to Paris for bread. In this state of things an unofficial enquiry has been made of me to ascertain if the American merchants would receive French permits to supply the south with provisions. To this enquiry I replied that our merchants like all others would act as upon calculation they considered it to be for their interest—but that I was of opinion that my government would not in the existing state of things countenance a partial intercourse of this kind. I further observed that if the Berlin and Milan decrees were off special permits could not be necessary—and that if they were not off I should not feel at liberty to listen to any new propositions without instructions from the President. I must confess that I heard with regret this enquiry as it seemed to imply that we could not be suffered even to feed their hungry without special permission. It explains however the character of the occasional modifications of the general system which we may expect in our favour. Of the same nature is the decree of the 1er of November permitting the produce of Java and the Mauritius to be imported *direct to France* in American vessels on paying one fourth only of the ordinary duties. In a conversation I had with the Duke of Cadore relative to this decree—and in which I wished to ascertain if the word direct applied to the *nature* of the voyage or merely to the route in which it was performed —(that is if American vessels might touch in the United States without breaking bulk)—and if the ports of Holland were to be considered

under that decree as ports of France—I could obtain no other answer *than that the decree spoke for itself.* The language however which it speaks is not very explicit and promises no national advantage to the United States but is intended merely to tempt adventurous individuals among us to undertake for the convenience of France what her subjects at the moment are incapable of performing.

The indulgencies however which she grants to us, and which she nicely measures by her necessities, are greater than any which she allows to her allies. On them she ruthlessly inflicts all the calamities of her system while she reserves to herself alone all the relaxations by which its operation can be mitigated. The faculty of granting permits and licences is her exclusive prerogative and the commerce they occasion she severely monopolizes. By this mode of proceedure she prevents abuses which would undoubtedly be practiced to the benefit of her enemy—she favors her immediate subjects—and by forcing through her ports every article of foreign growth consumed on the continent she completely engrosses the whole revenue arising from impost. To this mode of executing her system I doubt not she will hereafter most rigidly adhere—and to it sooner or later all the powers of the continent will be compelled to subscribe. Of all these powers, if we except Austria who has no ports, Russia and Sweden even now are the only ones who are not completely subjected to it—and these powers will not long form an exception. It is probable indeed that even at this moment the resistance of Sweden is at an end. I have just been told by a person officially informed of the fact that on the 12th of Novr. the French Ambassador at the Court of Sweden made a positive demand that war should be declared against England within five days—and intimated that in case of a refusal he should immediately leave the country—an advertisement of the Swedish consul at Copenhagen on the 24th Novr. warning, in consequence of orders he had received, all Swedish vessels in the Danish ports to guard against capture by the English, renders it probable that the demand of the French Government has already been acceded to. This demand was no doubt made with a determination of giving to the continental system a more complete and efficient operation—for the war which Sweden can wage against England, in a military point of view, can be of little importance. Russia is then the only power which remains to adopt the measure and she must promptly decide on hostilities against commerce or against France—she must confiscate or fight and there is much reason to believe that she will elect the former. The promotion indeed of a French prince to the throne of Sweden appeared at first to alarm the Russian

Court—at least the Russian Ambassy here were startled at it. Professions of amity from this Government and strong assurances of the undisturbed possession of Findland [*sic*] joined to the vanity of their own victories over the Turks have again restored their confidence in this Government and disposed them to aid in its policy. They must be aware that their only means of securing their conquests in Turkey is by condescension to France. It is the foible of the Russian Government to overrate their acquisitions in that quarter and to be willing to make the most serious sacrifices in order to retain them.

The first fruits of the continental system in Russia, Denmark and Sweden will be national bankruptcy. The Bashaw principle of finance —plunder and extortion—which appears to be the handmaid of this system cannot long delay the evil and will aggravate it when it happens. Denmark and Sweden are indeed involuntary victims and will struggle to the last to preserve some character—the courts of the former have lately acquitted many American vessels and in some cases allowed respectable damages. Prussia altho she still retain[s] the shadow of sovereignty does not in fact enjoy a single one of its attributes. After an indiscriminate sequester of all property imported into her dominions she has as indiscriminately confiscated it. The whole, among which there is much belonging to American citizens, is ordered to be sold and the proceeds, it is said, will be applied to discharge the arrears of contributions due to France.

The spirit of the Spanish patriots continues unbroken and is every where in full activity excepting only where it is contrould by the immediate presence of the superior force of the French. The gigantic efforts called forth for the subjugation of that country leave however no room to doubt of the final issue of the sanguinary conflict. Still the world will learn how much more difficult it is to subdue a people than to conquer a vicious government. Troops, provisions and *money* pour in a constant current into that devoted country and leave France exhausted and impov[er]ished for the support of a most odious and inglorious cause.

The vessels at Bayonne which have not been taken into the service of the Government or otherwise disposed of are to be sold at public auction on the 15th of this month.

The compromised vessels for which I asked permission two months since to leave the ports of France are still detained. A conversation I have lately had with the minister of foreign relations with regard to them leaves no cause to expect that any general measure will be taken in their favour. He intimated however that if I would ask for them

seperately I should probably meet with success. As it was however the principle rather than the property for which I contended I cannot persuade myself to impliedly abandon the former by pursuing the undignified course he has suggested. I shall do however all I can to aid the individuals concerned as far as may appear to me to be compatible with national honour.

The free and negligent manner in which this letter is written will be sufficient to advise you that it is private and confidential.

I remain

faithfully and respectfully

Sir

Your very Hble Servt

JONA[THAN] RUSSELL.

Decr 5th

P. S. I have this moment learnt that Sweden has acceded to the demand of France—declared war against England and that the sequestration of all colonial produce will follow.

A schooner has just arrived at Bordeaux direct from Baltimore—called the Friendship. I know not how she will be received. I know however of no circumstance attending her voyage which can bring her within the Berlin and Milan decrees even if they be not rescinded. One thing however this case will ascertain viz. if colonial produce will be permitted in American vessels without a special permit or licence and I have reason to believe that it will not be so admitted.

The Honble Robert Smith

Secry of State of the United States.

XII. JOEL BARLOW TO JAMES MONROE.*

(Despatches, France, Volume 13, Despatch No. 9.)

PARIS March 15th 1812

Sir.

It seems that the Emperor never kept his Ministers so hard at work night and day as he has for a month or two past to organize and push forward the unexampled military force, before which Europe now trembles to her center, and to combine change and shuffle the diplomatic discussions which forebode a new and forced arrangement of her political powers. I mention this only as it effects [*sic*] our own affairs, and as it accounts for their delay.

*This despatch is printed in extract in *American State Papers, Foreign Relations,* III, 519. The printed parts are here inclosed in brackets. At the head of the letter is written in pencil, "Are the Extracts from this Letter such as the President approves—"

[I have scarcely been able to get an interview with the Duke of Bassano for the last fifteen days, though he has appointed several.—He has disappointed me in most of them, and I am sure with reluctance. Last evening I obtained a short audience, in which he declared that his great work of this continent was now finished, and he would be able after tomorrow to devote himself very much to the treaty with the United States, till it should be completed, and I left him rather with the hope than the full expectation, that he will have it in his power to keep his promise.]

I have not yet repented, though I cannot be sure I shall not repent, having detained the Hornet. Besides my reasons mentioned in my letters of the 28 January, the 8th feby. and 3d of march, it seemed that the presence of a public ship waiting only for the result of the negotiation might stimulate them to hasten that result and it would give me a double right to urge it. I am sensible that such a delay should have its limits, and I certainly will not suffer it to continue much longer. Indeed the departure of the Emperor will soon put an end to the detention of the ship if nothing else should do it. It is understood that he leaves Paris early in April to go and regulate Europe once more.—

It is doubtless impossible to penetrate his plan. The following string of conjectures is the most plausible, that I am able to give you, and some of them are supported by known facts. All the troops in Italy, Dalmatia and Istria, to be joined by the great contingent of Bavaria, are forming an army of 80,000 to 100,000 under Prince Eugene, ready to act upon the lower Danube or elsewhere for the purpose hereinafter mentioned.—

Three other principal armies are now forming and marching under Davost,* Ney and Mortier. These are composed of about 250,000 french and Dutch and about 150,000 of the contingencies of Baden, Wertembourg, Hesse, Westphalia, Saxony, Poland, and Prussia. In these three armies are included one hundred and twenty thousand horse.—

To enable him to carry his regular troops out of France with safety he has made another *Senatus Consultum* throwing all the male force of France, not now in the army, into three clases of national guards, the first class to include all unmarried men from 20 to 26 years of age, the second takes all from 26 to 40—the third from 40 to 60. The first of these is put immediately into activity of service, not however to be moved out of France, but doing the necessary duty within it, will enable him to withdraw all his regulars including the conscription of this year.

*Davout.

These armies are better provided, better organized, and are said to be better conducted than any that France has before sent abroad. The most authentic accounts of their total numbers vary from five to 600,000 men. Doubtless no such force has ever moved before at any one time in the service of any one Prince. Such are the means, now for the object.—

A few days ago in ordering the Council of State to prepare the Senatus Consultum for the national guards he prefaced the demand with these observations, "Some of the powers of Europe have not fulfilled their promise with respect to the continental system. I must force them to it. I love peace and tranquility, and I have done enough to deserve them. I even confess that I love pleasure. But when the interests of the nation calls [*sic*] I must relinquish them. I am going to put myself at the head of an immense military force. It will be a war of ten years. The national guards must be organized and put at my disposition. I shall not lead them to the end of the world, that is, not beyond the Illirian provinces or the present limits of France. But they must do the service of the interior and relieve the regular troops."

When this order was carried to the Senate the Minister in his report uttered this remarkable phrase "In whatever port of Europe a British ship can enter, there must be a french garrison to prevent it."

Thus far go our facts. From all which and from various appearances which are indescribable, it is believed that before fighting any battles he will invite his brother Alexander, and all others whom it may concern, to allow him to garrison all the ports on the Baltic and the Gulph of Finland, as far at least as Revel. If this prayer is refused he will fight them until it is granted; and in this crisis of the War Prince Eugene will march to the lower Danube to strike the Russian force in that quarter, and raise a little debt of gratitude upon the Turks, to be paid by and by.

As soon as this Russian War of one campaign is finished, or sooner if his first proposal is granted without a war, it will be agreed that he shall form a large round Kingdom of Poland, including Pomerania, Baltic Prussia and perhaps the coast as far as Riga. Then he is to compensate Alexander with the Turkish provinces north of the mouths of the Danube, gratify his father Francis with the Deltas of the Danube and the provinces south of it as far as the entrance of the Bosphorus; and setting down himself on the throne of Constantine, declare the natural boundaries of France to be the Hellispont and the Egean, extending its northern line in that quarter from the Southern bend of the

Black Sea to the northern limit of Istria, and tossing the turban out of Europe.—

I have the honor to be
Sir with great respect
Yr. Obt. St.

J. BARLOW

Hon: James Monroe.

XIII. JOEL BARLOW TO THE DUKE OF BASSANO.*

(Despatches, France, Volume 13, Despatch No. 11, Enclosure.)

Copy

1 May 1812.

Sir,

[In the note I had the honor to address to Your Excellency on the 10th. of November last, the spirit of the English Government was so far noticed as to anticipate the fact now proved by Experience that its orders in Council, violating the rights of neutrals, would not be revoked. The Declaration of the Prince-Regent, of the 21st. of April, has placed that fact beyond all question. In doing this he has repeated the assertion so often advanced by his ministers and Judges that the Decrees of France of a similar Character are likewise unrevoked.

You will notice that he finds a new argument for this conclusion in Your Excellency's late Report to the Emperor concerning neutral rights, in which you avoid taking notice of any repeal or modification of these Decrees, or of their non-application to the United States. We know indeed that they do not apply to the United States, because we do not suffer our flag to be denationalized, in the manner evidently contemplated by the Emperor in the rule he meant to establish. But it would have been well if Your Excellency had noticed their non-application to the United States, since his Majesty has uniformly done it in his decisions of Prize causes, since November 1810.] You would then have taken away the ground on which the Prince Regent has built his declaration; and this would have forced his ministers to find another pretext which must have been less plausible in the view of the People of England, and less calculated to embarass the american Government, in arming the Nation against the invaders of her rights.

[It is much to be desired that the french Government would now make and publish an authentic act, declaring the Berlin and Milan

*This letter is printed in extract in *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, III, 602. The printed parts are here inclosed in brackets.

Decrees, as relative to the United States, to have ceased in November 1810, declaring that they have not been applied in any instance since that time, and that they shall not be so applied in future.]

There are three substantial reasons which induce me now to propose this measure, and I beg leave to lay them before you with a solicitude commanded by their importance.

1st. It would greatly embarass the British Government in its measures of injustice; and since the Regent has decided not to repeal the orders in Council, which is now demonstrated, it would force his Ministers to take a less popular pretext for going to war with America; it would bring the manufacturing towns upon them with such loud Complaints as might induce other changes which cannot easily be calculated.

2d. Such an act on the part of France is absolutely necessary to the american Government; and tho' solicited as an accomodation, it may be demanded as a Right. That Government is now entering upon the most solemn and eventful scene of things that can present itself to a nation in the course of its existence, an appeal to arms—against an agressor far more powerful than itself. It is a war that requires the collected exertions of all our strength, a war that ought not be begun and cannot be successfully conducted, without that degree of unanimity among the People which can only rise from a universal sentiment of right. In this case it is not sufficient that the President and his Counsellors should see the justice of their cause and the truth of their assertions; but the People must see it; the Nation must know it. A War in our Country must be the business of the Nation. Tho' we do not all fight, we must all know why the fighting is done. The man who gives his money and the man who gives his blood will first convince himself that the object is worthy of its price.

Now it is well known to Your Excellency, it is well known to the world, for our public Documents are full of it, that great doubts exist in that Country, even among our best informed merchants, and in the hall itself of Congress *whether the Berlin and Milan Decrees are to this day repealed, or even modified in regard to the United States.* Your Report, of the 10th. of March, by its unaccountable reserve will augment that doubt, and the Prince Regent's Manifesto of the 21st. of April, is wisely calculated to confirm it in the minds of thousands of our influencial men. The Manifesto was made for that purpose, as well as for misleading the People of England; and the effect will be very great in both Countries, if not immediately met and destroyed by a more potent Declaration of the Imperial Government; more potent,

because it will be founded in truth, and will be only the fulfilment of its own promise. It would produce a perfect unanimity in America, while it would put the Prince Regent completely in the wrong, in the view of his own people, and thereby paralyze the exertions of his ministers.

3d. I will ask Your Excellency whether the Emperor does not owe it to his own Dignity and the reputation of his Government, to remove all doubt and silence every tongue, as to the revocation of these Decrees. Why should he leave it in the power of artful men to assert, and of credulous men to believe that he has not performed his word? The revocation of these Decrees, as they regard the United States, is an article of mutual convention, a solemn Contract between him and them. For this they gave an equivalent, an expensive equivalent; they consented to deprive themselves of the English Commerce: a sacrifice which they have made in the face of the world, public and palpable, by a legislative act, by an executive proclamation, by punishing all infractions, and now by raising a hundred thousand troops to cope with the second power in the universe, irritated to madness by the honest execution, on our part, of that sacred Convention with France.

If it was the Duty of France to cease to apply those Decrees to the United States, it is equally her duty to promulgate it to the world in as formal a manner as we have promulgated our Law for the exclusion of British merchandize. She ought to declare and publish the non-application of these Decrees in the same forms in which she enacted the Decrees. The President has instructed me to propose and press this object with that frank, but friendly firmness with which a consciousness of right, on the one side, and of obligation on the other, demands in any Case the fulfilment of a Treaty. And the interests of the two Parties are here so manifestly the same as to forbid the fear of giving offence, if I present the argument without disguise.

The ground to be taken for the Declaration I demand is plain. The State of things is very different now from what it was in August 1810, when the letter of your predecessor announced the revocation. He then added a condition subsequent, the execution of the act of Congress on which the revocation was predicated. That Condition is completely performed on our part; the revocation should therefore be declared absolute,—unclogged with conditions and unshaded with Doubts, as to the past, the present and the future.

[The Case is so simple, the Demand so just and the necessity so urgent, that I cannot withold my confidence in the prompt and complete success of my proposition.]

The Union of interests between the two Countries and the pressure of the present Crisis induce me to add another proposition, which I do with an equal hope of success. [The Declaration I solicit, tho' important in itself, should not be sent to the United States alone. It ought to be accompanied with two other acts of equal or superior moment. These are a Convention of Indemnity for past spoliations of american Property, in violation of our neutral rights, and a Treaty of Commerce founded on the liberal principle of reciprocal benefit and concession, which I have understood from Your Excellency that His Majesty is ready to subscribe.]

These three public Documents, against either of which I presume there is no objection, arriving together in the United States, would produce a great and salutary sensation; and it is with confidence that I assure Your Excellency of my firm belief that His Majesty's Empire would be as widely and solidly benefitted by these arrangements as the Country in whose name I have the honor to speak.

A Corvette of the United States, a very fast sailor, is now waiting at Cherbourg for my dispatches. If these arrangements could be completed within a few days, to be carried by that ship, they would probably arrive at Washington, as soon as the Declaration of the British Government, a piece most artfully calculated for that Country, for which it is evidently contrived and critically timed. Left to take its Course in America, without its antidote, it will produce a most deleterious effect: but being confronted by the Documents here proposed, it will return to its native Cabinet, with the contempt of an insulted nation, and cover its authors with confusion.

Accept the assurances of my high Consideration.

J. BARLOW

To his Exy. the Duke of Bassano.

XIV. JOSEPH EVE TO DANIEL WEBSTER.

(Despatches, Texas, Volume I.)

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES

GALVESTON March 10th 1842

The Honle.

Daniel Webster Secretary of State

Of the United States

Sir

The Congress of Texas having adjourned on the Sixth of Febuary and the President and Secretary of State as well as the Secretary of the Treasuary having left Austin, I left there on the ninth of Febuary, and arrived in Galvaston on the 15th. The President and Secretary of

State are in Galvaston and are now engaged in issuing Orders to have the militia equipt and ready to march to any point and at any moment. News has reached here to day by express that Sanantonia, about three hundred miles South West from Galvaston has been taken by the Mexican Army supposed to be twenty thousand strong. It is believed here that Corpus Christi seventy miles below here has fallen into the hands of the Mexicans, and great fears are entertained that they are in Austin before this time

It has been rumoured here for the last ten days, that the Mexicans were coming in great force, But the President did not believe the report, I however on yesterday addressed a letter to him, requesting to be informed whither he intended to remove the Archives of this Government from Austin a copy of which I herewith enclose for your inspection; I have received no written Answer from the President as he has been much engaged but in a conversation with him this evening he informed me that he had given orders to have all the Archives removed forthwith. I have therefore considered it to be my duty to have the Archives of the United States belonging to this Legation removed; As the people here believe that the Mexicans will not respect the flag of the United States in Texas; I cannot myself entertain the least fears either for the Archives or for myself, or family.

I consider this Government in a most deplorable condition, without a dollar in the Treasuary and without credit to borrow money here or abroad with not a regular Soldier belonging to the Army, and a very great excitement against the President for not having ordered out the militia previous to this time. large meetings have been gotten up in most of the counties resolutions adopted and commitees apointed to wait on him with a request that he would have the militia organized, equipted and officers appointed with orders to be in readiness to march at a moments warning; The President not believing the rumours untill the express arived to day refused to do so; the people in almost every county have organized, armed and equipt themselves by voluntarily contribution and about two thousand are on their march to Sanantonia. At least two hundred Volunteers will leave this city tomorrow at their own expence it is said that the President has issued orders that no citizen is to leave this Island as he anticipates great danger of an attact upon Galvaston; but the Volunteers will disregard the order. The district court was in session here but has adjourned this evening and the Judge with every member of the bar except one has volunteered, and will leave here for the Army tomorrow. I have never seen so much enthusiasm among any seem to be anxious to meet the foe,

and all seem to think that if they can embody five thousand Texians, they can defeat twenty thousand Mexicans. Genrl. Arista commands the invading Mexican Army, and has issued a conciliatory and imposing proclemation, it will however have but little effect upon the Texians

Since my arival at this place from Austin, the Merchants and traders, from the United States, have expressed great dissatisfaction at the advantages given by this Government to the commerce of France, over that of the United States. On the 27th of Febuary I addressed a note to Doctor Jones Secretary of State for Texas; on that subject a copy of which as well as Mr. Jones answer I have the honor herewith to enclose to you. With sentiments of high regard

I have the honor to be

Your Obt. Servt.

JOSEPH EVE.

XV. A. J. DONELSON TO JOHN C. CALHOUN.

(Despatches, Texas, Volume 2, Despatch No. 3.)

WASHINGTON TEXAS

Novr. 24t. 1844

Honble J. C. Calhoun Secy of State of the U States

Sir,

I have the pleasure to state to you that President Houston reached this place last night; and favored me with an interview in less than fifteen minutes after his arrival.

In order that you may see the character of his views, I will give you a narrative of our conversation, very much in the order in which the topics arose, and were disposed of.

Adverting to the situation of Texas he dwelt with satisfaction on his success in defeating the schemes of many adventurers, who had found their way into Congress and other Departments of the Government: and declared that if he had not been disturbed by the *Texan artifices* [?] (alluding to those who furnished evidence of the desire of the people for annexation) he would have accomplished the measure himself. His idea was, that, England and Mexico encouraged by the hope of defeating the policy of the United States—and, the United States alarmed, in their turn, by the fear of English intrigue—gave him a lever on the question which it was his intention to use, so as to restore Texas to our Union, whenever he found it practicable. He denounced, in his peculiar manner, those who forced him to abandon

his policy, and shew his hand before it could be played with success. He blamed Messrs Henderson and Vanzant for signing the Treaty without obtaining a fuller guarantee from the Executive of the United States to defend Texas, should the proposition for annexation provoke a renewal of hostilities on the part of Mexico, or otherwise expose her to injury.

I told him in reply that so far as the Executive of the United States was concerned there had been, and was, every disposition to befriend Texas, and even to defend her in the manner suggested, but that he was aware of his limited powers, and of the consequences which would have resulted from a disagreement between him and Congress in the exercise of an act which might have been deemed warlike. The executive, with no Congress to sustain him, would necessarily have failed, and thus the cause of annexation would have received a prejudice far greater than it did from the course adopted. I also brought to his recollection that the remedy for all such cases in the United States was in an appeal to the people—that this appeal had been made, and the issue of the Presidential election just closed, if favorable to Mr Polk, would prove that the course of Mr Tyler in regard to the policy of annexation had the popular sanction.

He said, that he was far from censuring President Tyler or his cabinet—that he accorded to Mr Tyler all praise for his patriotism and vigilance; and that he requested me to say to him in his judgment, of all the Presidents since Mr Jeffersons day, he was the only one to be compared with Genl Jackson; and further whatever might be the fate of Texas, in, or out, of the Union, her people would soon be rich, and that they would erect a monument which would perpetuate their gratitude to Mr Tyler.

I returned him my thanks for these generous and noble sentiments, and hailed them as evidence that the cause of annexation was still dear to the hearts of the brave people he had so signally served; and further remarked that I trusted nothing had been done to commit Texas to a policy inconsistent with the speedy consummation of the measure. That from the open avowal Genl Terrill had made of opposition to the policy of the United States on this subject, and from the concurrence in such sentiments generally manifested by the subordinate officers of his Government, I had been led to fear some line of conduct had been adopted which would render the contest in the United States abortive.

He replied that he was not in the habit of committing himself—that "leaky vessels won' hold water long"—that he had much to say on this subject (h his friends were present). As soon

as they retired he insisted on my remaining with him. I did so. He then resumed the conversation by observing, that he could conceal nothing from me, acquainted as I was with his trials and sufferings thro life, and coming as I did from the Hermitage.

I replied to this, that Genl Jackson was still alive, and took an interest in his conduct, at this critical period, which he could imagine much better than I could express it—that he looked upon the annexation of Texas as the great question of the day, as having a greater influence on the affairs of this continent than any that had occurred since the Revolution; and he was anxious that his friend Houston whom Providence had made the prominent actor in it thus far, should maintain his elevated position to the close, and show that he comprehended the results which were to flow from its influence on the fate of free institutions—that he feared the path of his duty might be obscured by the arguments which would be adduced in favor of the seperate existence of the Republic, and by the plausibility which would be given to the idea of making Texas a nucleus for the formation of new states, extending to the Pacific, affording a refuge for the oppressed of all nations, and rivalling the United States—that yielding to such a prospect, so tempting to ambition, and so natural to the spirit of adventure already too much aroused by the course pursued by Mexico and the United States in postponing so long the settlement of their boundaries, Genl Jackson, feared his friend might overlook what was due to the more sober injunctions of wisdom and experience.

No—No—No—was the reply. Tell Genl Jackson that his counsels influence my spirit—that his words are treasures—that the young sergeant who profitted so much by his advice in his early career has only learned to value that advice the more as time and adversity have strengthened his faculties. Tell him that Saml Houston though distant from him in the wilderness, and abandoned to the chances of a merciless contest with Mexicans and savages, has not lost sight of the measure of annexation. He continued to remark in reference to the fear expressed concerning the purport of the instructions given to Genl Terrill, that I might dismiss it. He said it was true he, Rily, and a few others were opposed to annexation, but that this was no indication of the course of the Government—that Genl Terrill was not authorised to conclude a Treaty—that he had sent him to England and France to see what bids they would make, what boot they would give—that he was not authorised to commit the Government, and power, to do so, would not be given to him.

I told President Houston here, that I was truly gratified at this

frank declaration of his views and sentiments and more than happy to find them so favorable to annexation—that as soon as my credentials were received I would take pleasure in laying before him the views of my Government on that great question; and that I trusted he would not take ground on that part of the topics of his valedictory message, until I had an opportunity also of exhibiting to him the aspect of the opinion now existing in the United States on the subject—that I felt sure when he came to reflect on the views of my Government he would find them so reasonable and just as to command his respect and support.

To this he replied that he was glad the U S Government had made me the organ of their views; and that he would be proud to see annexation accomplished during my connection with the Government—that the Secretary of State was expected tomorrow, but if he did not arrive he would give a temporary appointment to some one else to hasten my official presentation.

I remained with the President nearly all night, there being nothing but a door to seperate our apartments, which are open log cabins. He was unreserved and cordial, and as far as I can form an opinion, determined to adhere to the idea of annexation as long as there is a hope of effecting it on terms of honor and justice to his Republic.

It is, perhaps, due to the President that I should not omit to state, that, in the course of our free and general range over the many topics suggested by the examination of the relations of the two Republics; among which, suggested by myself, was the prominence that annexation would assign to him as a citizen of the United States, he uniformly repelled the idea of personal political views. He declared it to be his intention to retire to his plantation on the Trinity river and devote the remainder of his life to the pursuits of agriculture and the education of his son. He said no inducement should tempt him from this retirement after the establishment of the independence of the Republic—that his ambition was satisfied—he had made no money and had no means of support except what would arise from the improvement of his lands—yet he hoped to have enough to pay the expenses of a pilgrimage to the Hermitage next spring, after which he would bid adieu to all other expectations save those which would centre around his own domicil.

This frame of mind, seeming to me to harmonize with a calculation of interest d· upon annexation, is worthy of notice as an interpreter of hi· haps as reliable as any of the expressions referred to. Th· ch would follow the extension of the laws

of the United States over this Republic, having the power which our flag would have to banish all apprehension of invasion or disorder, foreign or domestic, would at once raise the value of these lands, and in many other respects increase the wealth and population of the country—a consequence which must be seen by President Houston.

I have, thus, Sir, laid before you a random view of my first conversation with the President, at the risk of fatiguing you with details which ought not to have a place in a public document. In my next dispatch I shall give you what passes at my presentation, and endeavor to possess something in an official form which will be more pointed and explicit.

In the mean time I have the honor to be with great respect

Your obt servant

A J DONELSON





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